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Following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
"Code"),' the United States bankruptcy system experienced a number of
growing pains. The Code ushered in a new way of looking at the entire
bankruptcy process. As a result, Congress, courts and bankruptcy practi-
tioners have spent the last ten years trying to convert the language of the
Code into a workable bankruptcy system.
This conversion is nearly complete. Most major problems associated with
the new Code have been resolved. For example, Congress and the courts
have finally reached a solution to the jurisdictional problems laid bare in
the Supreme Court's Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co. 2 decision. Further, the United States Supreme Court recently
resolved a dispute concerning the fundamental scope of adequate protection.
3
As the Court resolves these issues, the lower court decisions have begun to
exhibit a reasonable degree of consistency.
o 1990 John T. Cross.
* B.S., Bradley University, 1981; J.D., University of Illinois, 1984. Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Louisville.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1329
(1982 & Supp. 1986)) (effective October 1, 1979). The 1978 Code has been altered by several
amendments. The 1978 Code and all amendments will be collectively referred to as the "Code."
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory sections cited in this article will be sections of the
Code.
2. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Based on the vast amount of literature and litigation generated by
Northern Pipeline, it is assumed that the reader has a working knowledge of that case and its
major implications. For the uninitiated, a good introduction can be found in I COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 3.01, at 3-6 to 3-14 (L. King 15th ed. 1988).
3. In United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988),
the Court rejected the creditor's contention that 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986),
was intended to compensate secured creditors for the delay in realizing on their collateral.
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Nevertheless, several important disputes remain. Although the courts have
resolved many issues of interpretation, they have been far less successful in
resolving a number of more fundamental issues involving the exact nature
of bankruptcy. The process of adopting and implementing the Code has
forced Congress and the courts to reconsider these fundamental issues from
several differing perspectives.
One fundamental issue which remains unresolved is the respective roles
of state and federal governments in bankruptcy. By revising both the
substantive law and the procedural elements of the bankruptcy system, the
Code has had a tremendous impact on this federal/state relationship. A
number of recent articles have generated a lively debate on this topic. 4 At
the risk of oversimplification, the basic issue discussed in these works is
whether Congress and the federal courts may-or should-alter state-created
rights in the process of granting bankruptcy relief. Of course, the very
notion of bankruptcy relief includes some modification of state law rights.
The most obvious example is discharge, in which state law rights are literally
erased.' The Code, however, contains a number of other situations which
give courts the power to modify or set aside some state law rights in the
course of bankruptcy proceedings. The courts and commentators hold widely
divergent views concerning the extent to which Congress and the federal
courts should create a bankruptcy system in which the state law rights of
parties differ in a bankruptcy court than in a state court.
The literature has typically portrayed the issue as a choice between federal
and state law. In other words, the focus has been on isolating those instances
in which a bankruptcy judge should use federal law to supersede or modify
state law rights. In many cases, however, a related concern arises. There is
no unified body of "state law." The United States is comprised of fifty states,
the District of Columbia and several territories. The substantive state laws 6
4. Compare Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 775 (1987) with Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. Rav. 815
(1987). See also Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain,
91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Creditors' Bargain]; Jackson, Translating Assets and
Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, XIV J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Translating
Assets]; Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953 (1981).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982).
6. As used in this article, the term "substantive laws" denotes those rules that would be
deemed rules of "substance" for state choice of law purposes. Although this definition is
admittedly vague, it is clear that the class of substantive laws under the definition is significantly
narrower than matters that would be deemed "substantive" for the purposes of applying the
doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Drawing a clear line between
rules of substance and rules of procedure is a task that has been attempted by many authors.
See, e.g., Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH.
L. Rav. 311, 360-64 (1980); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939). Perhaps the most
convenient definition is that offered in Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act:
In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. Rv. 356 (1977). The Redish & Phillips
article sets out four categories of rules:
(1) rules designed to provide behavioral guides or to attain state policy goals;
(2) rules designed for the conduct of litigation that favor either plaintiffs or
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defining the rights of the parties to a given transaction or event will rarely, if
ever, be identical in each of these fora. Therefore, a bankruptcy court7 must
do more than decide whether federal or state laws will decide the rights of
parties in a bankruptcy proceeding. Once a bankruptcy court decides that a
right is governed by state law, it must decide which state's law is applicable.
The answer to this second question may have a substantial impact on the
rights of the parties.
The issue of which state's law will govern a transaction is related to, but
distinct from, the federalism issues discussed in current literature. However,
the choice of law question explored in this article also presents federalism
defendants;
(3) rules that are designed to ascertain the truth, which are neutral between the
litigants; and
(4) housekeeping rules.
Id. at 394-95. The first two categories constitute "substantive" rules 'while the latter are
"procedural." This definition is more useful than the others because it focuses on the purpose
behind the rule instead of the impact that the rule might have on the outcome of the litigation.
7. This article will use "Bankruptcy Courts" to denote the court system created by the
Code. The noncapitalized term "bankruptcy court" will be used to refer to any federal court
hearing a claim in or related to a bankruptcy proceeding. As such, the "bankruptcy courts"
include both the Bankruptcy Courts and the federal district courts hearing bankruptcy related
claims either as a court of first impression pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982), or on appeal
from the Bankruptcy Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The term
"bankruptcy court" does not include the federal district courts in lawsuits where the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court is derived from a source other than 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
Therefore, it will be important to distinguish bankruptcy cases from general federal question
cases. In addition, the definition of bankruptcy courts excludes state or territorial courts, even
when those courts are hearing a bankruptcy-related claim following abstention by the bank-
ruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1982) or 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
For the purposes of this article, the differences between the Bankruptcy Courts and the
district courts hearing bankruptcy matters are largely irrelevant. Although the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts is somewhat narrower than that of the district courts in
bankruptcy (compare 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (Bankruptcy Courts) with 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982)
(district courts)), this difference does not affect the choice of law issue. This article will assume
for the sake of convenience that the bankruptcy court adjudicating the dispute has subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim.
The following discussion will also contrast the bankruptcy courts with the federal district
courts sitting in diversity. For the sake of convenience, the term "diversity court" will be used
to signify a federal court hearing a case in which jurisdiction is derived solely from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1982). Therefore, a court hearing a federal question, or a state law claim as ancillary
or pendent to a federal question, is not a diversity court.
8. As used herein, the term "state law" denotes the statutory and common law of the
states, the District of Columbia, and the territories. It excludes, however, all federal law -
even that which is not bankruptcy-related. A bankruptcy court deciding issues of nonbankruptcy
federal law does not face the same federalism concerns that are present when the bankruptcy
court adjudicates state law. Furthermore, because the federal courts are a single system, choice
of law questions do not often arise with respect to "which" federal law applies. Nevertheless,
conflicts can and do arise between the application of state law and federal nonbankruptcy
law. See, e.g., In re L.M.S. Assocs., Inc., 18 Bankr. 425 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Altair
Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984). These conflicts raise additional federalism issues
that lie outside the scope of this article.
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issues. In addition to a body of substantive law, every state has developed
its own set of choice of law rules to guide its courts in deciding whether to
apply that state's substantive law to a given transaction. 9 The choice of law
rules adopted by a state play a major role in defining the rights of litigants
in that state. Therefore, the same concerns that oblige a bankruptcy court
to adopt state substantive law might also oblige the court to take the
additional step of using state choice of law rules in selecting a particular
state's substantive law.' 0
The purpose of this article is to determine whether the bankruptcy courts
are bound to use state choice of law rules when adjudicating state law rights
in bankruptcy proceedings. The Code itself affords no guidance on this
issue. The Supreme Court's decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co.," however, indicates that the federal courts, in certain
cases, are required to adopt the choice of law rules of the forum state. The
Klaxon rule is based upon several principles, not all of which necessarily
apply in bankruptcy proceedings.' 2 At the very least, the Klaxon rule rep-
resents an application of the Rules of Decision Act. 3 Therefore, although
the Klaxon rule is sometimes construed as applying only in diversity cases,
the rule may also apply in bankruptcy to the extent that the principles
underlying Klaxon apply in bankruptcy.
The conclusion of this article is that not all elements of the Klaxon rule
apply in bankruptcy. Although a bankruptcy court adjudicating state law
rights must refer to state choice of law rules, a bankruptcy court-unlike a
diversity court-is not bound by forum choice of law rules. Instead, a
bankruptcy court has considerable discretion, within certain limits, to select
which state's forum choice of law rules to apply.
This article discusses the manner in which a bankruptcy court should
apply state choice of law rules in adjudicating state law rights. Although a
bankruptcy court is not bound by a state's forum choice of law rules, the
ultimate resolution of the forum choice of law issue in bankruptcy should
mirror the result a nonbankruptcy court would reach. As a result, the
bankruptcy court does not have unfettered discretion on this matter when
adjudicating state law rights. A bankruptcy court must select the choice of
law rules of a state whose courts could have heard the dispute outside of
9. For a general overview of various choice of law methodologies, see B. CURRm, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws (3d ed. 1986).
10. Of course, in many situations there will be no difference between using state conflicts
rules and "general" conflicts rules. For example, in actions involving disputed interests in real
property, it would be quite unusual for a court to determine the ownership of the property
using a substantive law other than the law of the forum where the property is situated. See
infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
11. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The Klaxon case is
discussed in greater depth infra at notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
12. The principles underlying the Klaxon rule are discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 108-28.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
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bankruptcy. This restriction ensures that a bankruptcy court will adjudicate
the parties' state law rights in accordance with the parties' reasonable
expectations. In so doing, a bankruptcy court acts in accordance with the
principles justifying the court's existence.
I. State Law in Bankruptcy
A. Bankruptcy as a Procedural Device
A discussion of choice of law rules applicable in bankruptcy requires an
understanding of the fundamental nature of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is best
conceptualized as a federal procedure for the adjudication of all claims and
interests affecting the estate of a single debtor. 4 In most cases, the property
rights of the parties involved in a bankruptcy proceeding are determined in
accordance with state law. 5 In essence, then, the bankruptcy laws are a
framework for the efficient adjudication of nonbankruptcy rights. Absent
some overriding federal policy, a bankruptcy court's interpretation of rights
originating in state law should mirror a state court's interpretation of such
rights as closely as possible. If the result in bankruptcy is significantly
different, it will frustrate the reasonable commercial expectations of the
parties to a transaction, and possibly create incentives or disincentives,
unrelated to insolvency, for the use of bankruptcy.' 6 In addition, a bank-
ruptcy court, by reaching a different result, steps out of its role as a
"convenient single forum" for hearing state claims, and into a new, more
active role. Congress did not intend the bankruptcy courts to play this more
active role absent some bankruptcy-related reason to do so.
B. A Point of Reference: the Nature of State Rights
Presented in a Bankruptcy Proceeding
Bankruptcy, then, is primarily a federal procedure for the adjudication
of various rights and remedies created for the most part by state law. Before
discussing the various ways in which state law is relevant in bankruptcy, it
is necessary to establish, as a point of reference, the nature of the rights
presented to the bankruptcy court for adjudication. In other words, state
choice of law rules become a consideration only when the proceeding before
a bankruptcy court involves the adjudication of state law rights. If the
14. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). See also Vanston Bondholders
Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 171 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), reh'g
denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1946); 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §
45.2 (1965); Translating Assets, supra note 4, at 74-75; Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1013, 1035 (1953).
15. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 49 (1979); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966);
Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958); Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280 (1957); Thompson
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); In re Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694
F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1982). Of course, state law is not the only possibility. In some cases, the
rights may be determined in accordance with the laws of foreign countries.
16. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 958; Baird, supra note 4, at 824-28.
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rights involved are purely federal, there is no reason to require a bankruptcy
court to use state choice of law rules.
A bankruptcy court, however, usually will not have the opportunity to
analyze each state right held by a party to a bankruptcy proceeding. Instead,
it will adjudicate a given state law right only if that right is presented to
the court in the context of some cognizable claim for relief. From a
procedural standpoint, bankruptcy courts adjudicate claims which are simply
an amalgam of various rights. Before a set of rights can be called a "claim,"
however, one must determine whether some body of law recognizes a claim
in the given circumstances. The body of law that gives life to a set of rights
as a claim may be state law or federal law.
The choice of law analysis, however, should not focus exclusively on
whether the claim arises under state or federal law. In bankruptcy, it is
misleading to focus only on the source of the claim. Most of the "claims"
faced by a bankruptcy court arise under the Code. It is the Code that
defines the posture in which a party presents a dispute to the bankruptcy
court.' 7 Instead of viewing a claim as the fundamental unit, a bankruptcy
court should dissect the claim into its component rights. The "nature" of
a claim is ascertained solely by determining the nature of the rights that
17. For example, imagine a dispute in a bankruptcy case involving the amount that the
debtor owes to a creditor because of a breach of contract. The substantive rights involved
arise under state law. Nevertheless, in bankruptcy the dispute would arise as part of a federal
claim. In all likelihood, the bankruptcy court would hear the claim because the trustee or
some other patty in interest objected to the proof of claim filed by the creditor.
The right to object to the proof of claim - i.e., the right to bring the proceeding - arises
under federal law and, therefore, is technically a federal "claim." In this situation, the court
should apply bankruptcy law to determine the few "federal" elements of this claim, such as
whether the proof of claim satisfies the requirements of the Bankruptcy Rules. The basic
relationship between the parties, however, is originally defined by state law. State law should
accordingly be used to resolve this element of the proceeding. By focusing on the source of
the "claim," the bankruptcy court may make the mistake of applying federal law to matters
that should be governed by state law.
This is not to say, however, that the source of the claim is in no way relevant to the choice
of law question. Unlike the example given above, there are instances in which the Code creates
substantive federal rights from the existing web of state law relationships. The preference
provisions of the Code (primarily 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) are a good example
of this. The federal substantive right created by section 547 comes into being if certain
conditions are met. These conditions, however, are defined in part by the existing web of
rights existing as of the date of bankruptcy. For example, under section 547(e), the court must
determine whether the creditor's interest would take priority over other enumerated creditors.
This subissue involves the adjudication of existing state law rights. Therefore, a claim to set
aside a preference will involve the interpretation of "rights" arising under both federal and
state law. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
Although the bankruptcy court should use state law to interpret state law rights irrespective
of whether those rights are presented to the court in the course of a federal "claim," the
source of the claim may have some bearing on the separate but distinct choice of law question.
In other words, the degree to which the bankruptcy court is obligated to use state conflicts
rules in selecting which law to apply may be different in the case of a federal claim than it is
in the case of a state law claim. This issue is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 178-
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must be adjudicated in order to resolve that claim. Accordingly, a claim is
purely a state claim only if all of the rights that must be determined are
state law rights. Conversely, a pure federal claim is one in which all the
rights exist independent of state law.
Admittedly, this focus on "rights" differs somewhat from the traditional
approach to the choice of law question in federal courts. The traditional
approach typically focuses on whether the case before the court involves a
state law "claim" or "issue." ' The terms "claim" and "issue," however,
are not particularly relevant when assessing a proceeding before a bankruptcy
court.19 The true nature of a claim or issue can be determined only by
subdividing it into its component rights.
C. How State Law Arises in Bankruptcy
A bankruptcy case commences with the filing of a petition.20 At that
moment, a debtor steps into bankruptcy as the center of a web of financial
relationships. This web, however, is generally created and defined by state
law. The first duty of a bankruptcy court is to ascertain the exact contours
of these state law rights. A bankruptcy court must determine what claims
by and against the debtor exist before it can determine how those claims
will fare in bankruptcy.
Because state law creates most of the rights that make up the web, state
law will normally be the primary point of reference in interpreting the web.
2'
When determining the nonbankruptcy rights of parties involved in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, a bankruptcy court is essentially divining the rules of
state law to adjudicate state law rights. Although federal law dictates which
rights are recognized in the bankruptcy proceeding, it does not replace state
law as the source of those rights. In this respect, bankruptcy courts are
more closely related to diversity courts than to federal courts sitting in
federal question cases. 22
18. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); Mater-
nally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956) (Erie
applies "to any issue or claim which has its source in state law").
19. The problems arising from using "claims" as the focal point are discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 17-18. The term "issues" is of little use primarily because it is
ambiguous. If one is speaking of purely factual issues, the term is useless from an Erie
perspective. The basic facts underlying a dispute do not "arise" under either federal or state
law. The court does not have to look to any body of law to determine, for example, if the
building leased by the claimant has a leaky roof.
Confining one's analysis to "legal" issues is similarly misleading, because that term is
tautological in the context of choice of law analysis; an issue is a "federal" issue only if it is
to be decided under federal law. This cannot be determined by merely focusing on the issue
itself. Instead, the court also needs to know the context in which the issue arises; namely, the
underlying facts and the source of the primary right being adjudicated. These factors have a
greater impact on the choice of governing law than the bare legal issue itself.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The petition can be filed voluntarily by the debtor or an
involuntary petition filed by one or more creditors. The additional requirements for an
involuntary petition are set out in 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
21. See authority cited supra in note 14.
22. There are several different categories of federal question jurisdiction. "General" federal
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
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This characterization, however, overlooks other important roles played
by a bankruptcy court. Although state law defines the parties who are in
financial relationships with the debtor prior to the bankruptcy petition, the
Code may alter the rights of some of the parties or create new rights from
the same underlying facts. A bankruptcy court may also be called upon to
determine rights that would not arise had the parties been confined to their
state law remedies. Because these new rights arise under a federal statute,
they cannot be classified as state law rights.
The matter is further complicated by the fact that few disputes placed
before a bankruptcy court involve solely state law or federal law rights.
Instead, most claims presented to a bankruptcy court involve some mixture
of the two types of rights. For purposes of convenience, claims that arise
in bankruptcy can be pigeonholed into four classes: pure federal claims,
pure state claims, mixed state claims and bankruptcy remedies.
1. Pure Federal Claims
In the course of a case arising under the Code, a considerable number
of procedural issues may arise concerning the manner in which the bank-
ruptcy system must deal with the various claims of debtors, their creditors
and third parties. These procedural issues generally can be resolved simply
by interpreting the language of the Code. For example, a motion by a
creditor objecting to the qualifications of a court-appointed trustee involves
issues that relate solely to federal bankruptcy law.23 State law plays no part
in the dispute. Because a bankruptcy court need look no further than the
Code, choice of law issues do not arise. These purely federal matters are
beyond the scope of this article.
2. Pure State Claims and Mixed State Claims
Most of the claims arising in bankruptcy, however, cannot be resolved
simply by reading the Code. A bankruptcy court resolves numerous claims
involving primarily state law rights. In some situations, a state claim takes
a form virtually identical to the form it would take if prosecuted in state
court. In other situations, the state law rights acquire a federal flavor by
being transplanted into bankruptcy. Therefore, claims arising primarily
under state law can be classified into two broad categories.
question jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). In addition, there are various
types of "special" federal question jurisdiction, e.g., admiralty (28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)), patent (28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982)) and civil rights (28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982))
cases.
23. Sections 321 and 322 set out the eligibility and qualification requirements for the trustee
in bankruptcy. Other examples of purely federal rights are as follows: (a) the effect of the
automatic stay provided by section 362 (although the exceptions to and grounds for relief
from the stay do incorporate state law); (b) the duties of the debtor following commencement
of a bankruptcy caSe (section 521); and (c) the grounds for converting a case from one chapter
to another (sections 706, 1112, 1208, 1307).
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The first category, the "pure" state claims, includes claims that are
comprised almost entirely of state law rights. For example, a bankruptcy
court liquidating the estate of a debtor must determine what assets comprise
the estate and what liabilities are a charge against the estate. In determining
the existence and value of these assets and liabilities, a bankruptcy court
will be predominantly concerned with the underlying state law rights.
24
Although there are federal rights involved in the resolution of such claims,
they are minimal when compared to the important state law issues. 2
The second category of state law claims, the "mixed" claims, is comprised
of claims whose outcome may be affected by the Code. Various provisions
of the Code modify existing state law rights in the process of transplanting
the rights into bankruptcy. For example, the Code recognizes a creditor's
right to set off any amounts that the debtor owes to the creditor against
any payment that the creditor makes to the debtor.26 In dealing with a setoff
issue, a bankruptcy court must first look to state law to determine whether
a right to setoff exists. Even assuming that such a state right exists, however,
the Code places strict limitations on the use of setoff in bankruptcy cases.27
Although state law is the "source" of the right to setoff, this right is
modified once the debtor enters bankruptcy. 8 Thus, a bankruptcy court
24. The determination of whether an asset or liability exists must be differentiated from
the determination of whether that asset forms a part of the debtor's estate or whether the
creditor holding the claim will be allowed to participate in the bankruptcy liquidation. These
latter issues involve both federal and state law rights. See infra note 28.
25. In every bankruptcy case involving a trustee, the right of the trustee to recover on a
claim of the debtor is itself a "federal" right. See supra note 17.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
27. These restrictions are set out in section 553.
28. Sections 502 and 541 give rise to analogous situations. Under section 502, the bankruptcy
court must determine which of the various claims of the creditors will participate in the
bankruptcy case. Although the court looks to section 502 (and to the definition of a "claim"
in section 101(4)) to determine which claims are included, it must look ab initio to state law
to determine whether the creditor has a claim. In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483 (7th
Cir. 1988); In re John Clay & Co., 43 Bankr. 797, 807 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984). Cf. Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 159 (1946), reh'g denied, 329 U.S.
833 (1946); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946), reh'g denied, 328 U.S. 879 (1946).
But see Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1988) (even if claim not
currently cognizable at state law, may participate in bankruptcy), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct.
201 (1988).
Similarly, under section 541, the court must look first to state law and determine the scope
of the debtor's interest in property before it can reach the issue of whether that interest
becomes property of the estate. One of the interesting aspects of section 541 is that it reduces
the extent to which state law controls the determination of what is property of the estate.
Under the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) [hereinafter the "Act"],
repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, the courts
in bankruptcy cases focused on alienability as a key element in determining ownership of
property. If a debtor's property interest was not alienable outside of bankruptcy, it would in
most cases be excluded from the estate. See, e.g., Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
State exemption laws also could affect the property that passed to the trustee under the Act,
because exempt property did not become property of the estate. National Bankruptcy Act of
1898, at § 6; Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 299 (1903). Because the Act relied
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
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must do more than resolve state law rights. It must also interpret important
rights arising under a federal statute.
29
In cases in which a bankruptcy court faces a mixed claim, choice of law
issues may arise with respect to the state law components of the claim. The
additional federal elements involved in the claim make the choice of law
question more difficult. Unlike the situation with a pure state claim, federal
law does more than establish the procedure by which a claim is presented
to the court. Federal law also modifies the claim. Therefore, one can make
a colorable argument that the federal nature of the claim frees a bankruptcy
court of any obligation it might otherwise have to apply state choice of law
rules.
3. Bankruptcy Remedies
As discussed previously, a debtor's financial relationship with others prior
to bankruptcy gives rise to certain state law rights. The Code, however,
grafts additional rights and responsibilities to this existing network of state
law relationships. Most of these additional rights and responsibilities do not
exist at state law. For example, the Code gives a debtor the ability to avoid
certain nonpossessory liens on exempt property.30 As another example, the
Code grants a bankruptcy trustee the right to set aside various transfers of
a debtor's property that occurred prior to filing the petition.3 These rights,
upon state law to determine a debtor's exemptions, the definition of property of the estate
could vary greatly from state to state.
Under the Code, these criteria are largely irrelevant. First, a debtor's interest in property
passes to the trustee regardless of whether the debtor has a right under state law to alienate
that interest. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 368 (1977). The only exception to this rule is a debtor's interest as beneficiary under
aspendthrift trust, which, if valid under state law, does not pass to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. §
541(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In addition, property of the estate now includes both exempt
and nonexempt property. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1977).
29. Another example of a mixed claim is one arising under section 544(b), where the trustee
succeeds to any state law rights held by an existing unsecured creditor of the debtor. This
section enables the trustee to avoid bulk transfers and fraudulent conveyances under state law.
Section 544(b), however, modifies the state law remedy in two ways. First, it effects a change
in the plaintiff, because it is the trustee, not the creditor, who asserts the right. Second, and
more importantly, section 544(b) increases the scope of the state remedy. Under state law,
only the creditor with the right to set aside the transfer benefits from avoidance of the transfer.
Under section 544(b), the avoidance benefits the estate itself, thereby inuring to the benefit of
virtually all of the unsecured creditors. See Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931); Note, Applicability
of State Conflicts Rules When Issues of State Law Arise in Federal Question Cases, 68 HARV.
L. REv. 1212, 1220 (1955). Therefore, transplanting the state law right into the bankruptcy
forum alters its parameters. As a result, the trustee's rights under section 544(b) depend on
both federal and state law.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1982).
31. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a), 548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under section 544(a), the
trustee may avoid any lien that would be junior to a judgment lien creditor who took its
interest as of the date of bankruptcy. Section 548, the "federal" fraudulent conveyance
provision, is discussed infra at note 32.
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although arising out of the web of state law rights existing on the date of
bankruptcy, generally differ from the rights existing under state law.32
This is not to say that state law is irrelevant. Although bankruptcy law
gives rise to the basic dispute, the dispute cannot be resolved without
reference to state law. The various remedies that the Code creates in favor
of a trustee and other parties only exist if certain conditions are satisfied.
To determine whether these conditions exist, however, a bankruptcy court
must ascertain whether certain state law rights are present. 33 Therefore,
although the proceeding involves a federal substantive right, a bankruptcy
court must also resolve subsidiary state law rights. As discussed previously,
a bankruptcy court should use state law in evaluating these subsidiary state
law rights.34 As in the situation of state mixed claims, however, the federal
32. Another example of a bankruptcy remedy is a preference, which is governed by section
547. Preferences are often considered to be a remedy unique to bankruptcy. Some states,
however, have passed statutes condemning preferential transfers by an insolvent party. These
statutes are generally limited to transfers made by a corporation anticipating liquidation.
Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part 11), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631,
632 (1972).
The bankruptcy remedy perhaps most similar to the existing state law rights is the "federal"
fraudulent conveyance remedy set out at section 548. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Depending on the state's fraudulent conveyance rules, section 548 may afford the trustee few,
if any, rights that would not be available to the trustee as successor to the state law creditors
under section 544(b). Nevertheless, even in those situations where the state fraudulent convey-
ance law closely parallels the provisions of section 548, the federal remedy affords the trustee
an important advantage over the state law remedy. Under section 544(b), the trustee must
identify an actual unsecured creditor who would have the right to attack the transaction under
state fraudulent conveyance law. Because state fraudulent conveyance law is often available
only to creditors who exist at the time of the conveyance (see, e.g., Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act § 7) the lack of such a creditor may render a transfer immune from attack
under section 544(b). Section 548, however, allows the trustee to avoid the transfer regardless
of the existence of an actual creditor. Accordingly, the federal provision may create rights
where none existed at state law.
33. For example, the trustee may only set aside an allegedly preferential transfer if it occurs
within a specified period prior to bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
To resolve this timing issue, the court must determine when the transfer occurred. Although
section 547(e) specifies when the transfer is made, it incorporates the governing state law rules,
inter alia, the attachment and perfection of security interests.
State law issues can also arise in other contexts of preference law. Miller v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 406 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pre-Code decision), aff'd, 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.
1976). In Miller, the trustee was attempting to recover two payments that the debtor had made
pursuant to a loan from the creditor to the debtor. In order to decide the preference question,
the court had to determine whether the creditor was secured by an interest in various funds
that the debtor had deposited in the creditor bank. This required the court to look at state
law governing assignments of contractual rights.
As discussed supra at note 32, another example of a "hybrid" action is a proceeding to
recover a fraudulent conveyance under section 548. Section 548, like section 547, also depends
upon state law for certain crucial definitions. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (a "transfer" is deemed to have occurred for purposes of section 548 when a bona
fide purchaser from the debtor cannot obtain an interest superior to that of the transferee).
34. The preceding discussion of the bankruptcy remedies has emphasized the trustee's
avoidance powers. The bankruptcy remedies are not limited to claims arising under Subchapter
III of Chapter 5. For example, section 365 provides the trustee with the power to assume or
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nature of bankruptcy remedies create some uncertainty as to whether state
law or federal law should be used in selecting which state's substantive law
determines these underlying issues.
III Choosing a S/ate Law
When faced with a choice of law question, a bankruptcy court must look
beyond the terms of the Code. The Code and its legislative history offer
little guidance on the choice of law problem. Although the Code develops
certain concepts in excruciating detail, it nowhere provides general rules to
guide a bankruptcy court in its selection of the proper state law to adjudicate
state law rights.3" Therefore, a court must look to other sources for the
methodology to be used in its selection of which state's substantive law to
apply.
A. The Approach Taken By Bankruptcy Courts
A significant number of bankruptcy courts have faced the choice of law
issue in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. 6 Not all of these cases are
reject an executory contract. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under section
365(b), the trustee must meet certain criteria if she wants to assume a contract under which
the debtor is in default. The Code does not define, however, what constitutes a "default,"
although section 365(b)(2) does specify that certain types of defaults can be ignored. Because
state law typically defines the obligations of the parties to the underlying contract, the court
should look to state law to determine which omissions or commissions constitute a default.
Similarly, the question of whether a claim is dischargeable in bankruptcy may involve
questions of both federal and state law. The court in In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981), was faced with the question of whether certain court-
ordered payments that the debtor owed to his ex-spouse constituted alimony or a property
settlement. If characterized as alimony, the obligation to make the payments would survive a
discharge in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(5). 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
The court held that, although the definition of alimony was one of federal law, that definition
depended upon the substantive rights of the parties under the governing state law. In re Crist,
632 F.2d at 1229.
The exemption provisions of the Code present a similar situation. Unless a state makes use
of the Congressional authorization to override the federal exemptions, a debtor in a bankruptcy
case may elect to use the list of exemptions enumerated in section 522(d) of the Code. 11
U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Even if the debtor elects the federal exemptions,
however, state law plays an important role. Although federal law enumerates those interests
of the debtor which are exempt, it is state law that creates and gives form to the underlying
interests.
35. In one specific instance, however, the Code does supply choice of law rules. See infra
note 75.
36. Of course, in many multistate cases choice of law will not be an issue. For example,
the parties may have agreed in their pleadings that a given forum's law will govern the dispute.
See, e.g., In re Duplan Corp., 455 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). A different situation is
presented by a choice of law clause in a contract. Even though the contracting parties have
agreed that the law of a given forum will govern their obligations, the court may nevertheless
be faced with a choice of law issue: whether to enforce the clause. Generally, a contractual
choice of law clause will be enforced if the contract bears a reasonable relationship with the
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relevant to the topic at hand. For instance, in many situations a court is
faced with a "false conflict" where resolution of the choice of law issue
does not affect the outcome of the proceeding. Questions involving interests
in real property often create false conflicts. Under general conflicts princi-
ples, questions involving interests in real property will in all likelihood be
determined by the law of the situs of the property. 7 Therefore, the outcome
of a dispute involving interests in real property will be the same regardless
of whether a bankruptcy court uses the forum state's conflict laws, some
other state's conflict laws, or even "federal" conflicts law. 8 Because the
same substantive law would be chosen regardless of the choice of law rules
selected, a bankruptcy court need not face the more difficult federalism
issues underlying the choice of law decision. Accordingly, cases involving
false conflicts are not particularly helpful in resolving the choice of law
problem. 9
Even after excluding the false conflict cases, however, a substantial num-
ber of cases remain. These cases are surprisingly consistent. Most courts
that have determined an issue is governed by state law have also determined
that the choice of state law should be achieved by using state choice of law
rules. 40 Unfortunately, a review of the cases yields no uniform basis for this
chosen forum. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1985).
When faced with a choice of law clause, the court must elect whether to determine
"reasonableness" under a state or federal standard. If the court elects to use a state standard,
it may also be required to select which state's standard to apply. The few bankruptcy courts
that have faced this issue have elected to use a "federal" rule governing reasonableness of the
forum selection clause. See, e.g., In re Falk, 2 Bankr. 609 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980); Envirolite
Ents. v. Glastechnische Indus., 53 Bankr. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1986); In re Caldwell Port Elevator, Inc., 23 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1982).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 (1971).
38. In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1348 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Engstrom, 33 Bankr. 369 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983); In re Nite Lite Inns, 13 Bankr. 900, 907
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981). Thus, where all of the candidate choice of law rules would result in
selection of the same substantive law, the method used in choosing a choice of law system is
largely irrelevant.
Conversely, the underlying substantive law of all the candidate fora may be identical.
Therefore, even though the selection of a set of choice of law rules may affect the decision
of which state's substantive law is applied, the substantive law itself may be so similar as to
result in the same ultimate outcome. For example, there are very few cases under the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") involving genuine conflicts, primarily because the U.C.C. has
been adopted in substantially similar form in all states except Louisiana. Hence, in many cases
involving the U.C.C., it is irrelevant which law is selected by the court. See, e.g., In re
Worden, 63 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986) (choice of law rules lead to same result); In re
Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 419 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1969) (substantive law identical). See also
In re Merritt Dredging Co., 839 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2904 (1989),
discussed infra at note 43.
39. The adjudication of a party's interest in a trust comprised of tangible property presents
many of the same considerations. Therefore, these cases may also present false conflicts. See,
e.g., In re Torrez, 63 Bankr. 751 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1987);
In re Landis, 41 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 872 (1930); Danning v.
Lederer, 232 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1956).
40. See cases cited infra at notes 38 & 39.
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conclusion. Some courts elect to use state law without presenting any real
basis for their decision.41 Most of the other courts have simply cited Klaxon
as controlling. 42 Only a few have explored the issue in any depth. 43 Even
41. In re New England Fish Co., 749 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1984) (negligence claim);
In re Bagley, 6 Bankr. 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (validity of repossession of a debtor's
automobile); In re Worden, 63 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986) (status of creditor's interest
in accounts receivable); In re Bennett, 51 Bankr. 619 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984) (fraud in connection
with the procurement of a promissory note).
42. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Madison Nat'l Bank, 807 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re
Auto-Train Corp., 9 Bankr. 15§, 161 n.5 (Bankr. D.C. 1981); In re Medico Assoc., Inc., 23
Bankr. 307, 315 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re Shangri-La Nursing Center, Inc., 31 Bankr.
367 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Shepard, 29 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); In re
Sweetapple Plastics, Inc., 77 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987); In re Pester Ref. Co., 66
Bankr. 801 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1986), aff'd, 85 Bankr. 520 (S.D. Iowa 1987), aff'd [rev'd] in
part, 845 F.2d 1476 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Goldstein, 66 Bankr. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986);
In re B & L Oil Co., 46 Bankr. 731 (D. Colo. 1985); In re Eden Assocs., 13 Bankr. 578
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Energy Research & Dev. Corp., 7 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1981); In re Magnus Harmonica Corp., 159 F. Supp. 778 (D.N.J. 1958) (Klaxon applies
to all state law issues except interest, which is governed by federal law), aff'd, 262 F.2d 515
(3d Cir. 1959).
But see In re Knight, 76 Bankr. 857 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987); In re Smith, 66 Bankr. 58
(Bankr. D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 77 Bankr. 33 (D. Md. 1987), which hold that Klaxon is
inapplicable in bankruptcy. See discussion of Knight infra at note 71.
43. The most insightful circuit court opinion is the Fourth Circuit's in In re Merritt
Dredging Co., 839 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2904 (1989). The primary
issue in Merritt was whether a certain agreement constituted a security agreement for purposes
of bankruptcy. Because the agreement had significant connections with two states, the court
had to choose which state's law to use in deciding whether the agreement was a security
agreement. Id. at 205. After developing the arguments on both sides of the issue, the court
concluded that Klaxon controlled the adjudication of the state law issues. Id. at 206. Although
the court indicated that a compelling federal interest might lead to a different conclusion, it
could find no compelling federal interest in the facts of the case.
The Ninth Circuit employed a similar rationale in In re Holiday Airlines Corp., 620 F.2d
731 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980). In Holiday, the court was faced with an
issue similar to that in Merritt: the validity of artisan's lien on personal property. Unlike the
situation in Merritt, however, a federal statute governed the issue. Because the property at
issue was an airline component, the lien was governed by the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1542 (1982). Section 1406 of the Federal Aviation Act specifies which state's law is
to be used in determining the perfection of a state law lien in airplane components. The court
held that, under these circumstances, Klaxon does not require the bankruptcy court to follow
the choice of law rules of the forum. Because Erie is inapplicable where an Act of Congress
controls, the choice of law issue was controlled by the federal act, not Klaxon. The court's
decision implies, however, that Klaxon would control in the absence of the Federal Aviation
Act. Id. at 734.
Several bankruptcy judges have also been troubled by the role of Klaxon in bankruptcy.
Like the Merritt and Holiday opinions, several of the opinions have considered the validity or
priority of liens held by creditors in property of the debtor. The courts are split on the issue
of whether Klaxon controls. See, e.g., In re LMS Assocs., Inc., 18 Bankr. 425 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1982) (substantive law of the forum applied to determine whether liens were perfected
even though forum courts would have applied a different substantive law); In re Flying W
Airways, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (pre-Code case which applied Klaxon on issue
of lien validity); In re U.S. Repeating Arms Co., 67 Bankr. 990 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986)
(Klaxon applied on issue of whether creditor held a security interest). In addition, the appli-
cability of Klaxon has been considered in cases dealing with tort claims (Seitter v. Schoenfeld,
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the decisions that explore the issue are often unclear as to why Klaxon
controls the result in bankruptcy. The discussions rarely explore the various
considerations giving rise to the rule in Klaxon, and whether those consid-
erations apply in bankruptcy. Without understanding these principles, a
conclusion that Klaxon governs in bankruptcy begs the question. It is
therefore necessary to retrace the development of the current rules governing
state choice of law in the federal courts to discern those principles that
should guide the bankruptcy courts in their decision.
B. The Rules of Decision Act
The starting point in a court's analysis must be the Rules of Decision
Act (the "Decision Act")." Although the Code itself places no explicit
limitations on the choice of law methodology to be used in a bankruptcy
case, the bankruptcy courts, as federal courts, are bound by the provisions
of the Judicial Code. 41 To the extent that a provision of the Judicial Code
governs the choice of law issue in the federal district courts, it also dictates
the result in a bankruptcy court. Of all the provisions in the Judicial Code,
the one most likely to affect the choice of law issue is the Decision Act.46
The Decision Act mentions neither choice of law rules nor bankruptcy.
It is unclear, therefore, whether the Decision Act has any application
whatsoever to the choice of law issue in bankruptcy. In order to resolve
this issue, it is important to look in greater depth at the interpretation
afforded the Decision Act by the United States Supreme Court. A review
of the Supreme Court's interpretation reveals the full import of the Decision
Act.
678 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan. 1988) (Klaxon controls)), state law fraudulent conveyances (In re
OPM Leasing Servs., Inc., 28 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (since cause of action under
section 544(b) is created by state law, Klaxon controls)), measurement of damages (In re D.H.
Overmeyer Co., 12 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)(Klaxon controls), aff'd, 30 Bankr. 823
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)) and warranty claims (In re Barney Schogel, Inc., 12 Bankr. 697 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (although Klaxon is not controlling, the bankruptcy court should normally
apply forum choice of law rules in the absence of facts indicating otherwise)).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1980). The Decision Act states: "The laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
45. The Judicial Code is codified at title 28, of the United States Code. Section 151 of the
Judicial Code establishes the Bankruptcy Courts as a separate body of federal courts. As
discussed supra in note 7, the Judicial Code also sets forth the subject matter jurisdiction of
the district courts and Bankruptcy Courts in bankruptcy.
46. The recent articles dealing with state law in bankruptcy have generally ignored the issue
of whether the Decision Act and Erie are applicable in bankruptcy proceedings. With the
exception of Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 407, 409 (1972), which rejects Erie out of hand, authors have generally approached the
issue of whether a bankruptcy court must follow state law without reference to this body of
law. The reason for this omission is unclear to this author. Although it is admittedly open to
debate whether the Decision Act and Erie apply in bankruptcy, this issue certainly warrants
some discussion. Indeed, an earlier article dealing with the same federalism issues approached
the problem from the perspective of Erie. See Hill, supra note 14.
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1. The Requirements of the Decision Act
Originally enacted in 1789 as Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
the Decision Act addresses the law applied by the federal courts in civil
actions. 47 In essence, the Decision Act sets forth a general directive to the
federal courts to use state law as the "rule of decision" in civil litigation.
If the Decision Act governs in a given lawsuit, the federal court must look
to state law to adjudicate the primary rights of the parties.
The Decision Act, however, obviously does not apply to every lawsuit in
federal court. A federal court is freed of the Decision Act's requirements
if certain criteria are met. Therefore, the important issues that arise in the
interpretation of the Decision Act are not limited to determining which state
laws are "rules of decision." A court construing the Decision Act must
also recognize those instances in which some federal concern frees the federal
court from an obligation to apply state law. In the absence of this "federal
ingredient," the court must use state law as the rule of decision. It is useful
to focus narrowly upon those cases in which a sufficient federal ingredient
was found, because they illustrate the various exceptions to the application
of the Decision Act for federal courts.
Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 4 the courts have recognized several
instances in which the federal courts are freed from state law in adjudicating
a lawsuit.49 These cases may be classified into three broad categories:
47. As originally enacted, the Decision Act applied only to proceedings "at common law."
In 1948, however, the Act was amended to encompass "all civil actions." See 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (1982). This amendment supports the argument that the Decision Act is applicable in
bankruptcy. See infra note 137.
48. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
49. Most of the decisions that have considered the issue of state law in the federal courts
have focused on the broader Erie doctrine instead of the Decision Act. This is not to say,
however, that these decisions are not useful in interpreting the reach of the Decision Act. The
differences between the commands of the Decision Act and the Erie doctrine are difficult to
identify. The line of demarcation is particularly fuzzy because the Supreme Court, both before
and after Erie, has stated that the Decision Act "is merely declarative of the rule which would
exist in the absence of the statute." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945);
Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923). The full import of this statement is unclear.
The Court may be indicating that the Decision Act simply restates the requirements of the
Constitution. Cf. P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHIN & D. SIImo, HART AND WECHSLtER'S
THE FEDER.AL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 750 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER]. But cf. 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 870-74 (1953).
As discussed infra at text accompanying notes 108-11, the Erie doctrine is based in large
part on the language of the Decision Act. The reach of Erie, however, probably exceeds that
of the Decision Act. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (Erie extends
to actions in equity even though the language of the Decision Act was then limited to "suits
at common law"); Tuxedo Contractors, Inc. v. Swindell-Dresser, Inc., 613 F.2d 1159 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (although Decision Act does not mandate the use of the law of the District of
Columbia, a federal court sitting in diversity should use District of Columbia law as the rule
of decision). Therefore, the federal courts may be required to use state law as the rule of
decision even in areas not covered by the terms of the Decision Act. Because the Erie doctrine
is somewhat broader, a holding that the federal court is not required under Erie to apply state
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(1) where a federal court is adjudicating a case in which the basic rights
are created by a federal statute, treaty, or the Constitution;50
(2) where a federal court is adjudicating a case in which the basic rights
are created by certain narrow categories of federal common law;
5'
and
(3) where there is a federal interest that, although not giving rise to a
cause of action, nevertheless removes the case from a literal application
of the Decision Act.
52
The first category is justified by the language of the Decision Act itself.
By its terms, the Decision Act does not apply if the Constitution or a
federal treaty or statute provides otherwise. Accordingly, to the extent that
a court is adjudicating basic rights arising under a federal statute, or
interpreting the terms of that statute, it need not refer to state law.
The second category also follows, albeit more indirectly, from the Decision
Act. Under the Decision Act, a court need only utilize state laws "in cases
where they apply." '53 In other words, the federal court looks to state law
only in those situations where the primary rights being adjudicated are rights
created by state law. In certain narrow categories, however, federal courts
have created pockets of federal common law. Generally, this federal common
law applies in areas in which the Constitution grants the federal government
virtually exclusive authority. 4 If the subject matter of the lawsuit is governed
law in a given case of necessity means that the Decision Act does not control that case.
Therefore, cases refusing to apply state law under the Erie doctrine can be used as precedents
under the Decision Act.
The converse is more difficult to argue. Merely because a court holds that a federal court
is required to apply state law does not of necessity mean that the Decision Act is controlling.
Before these cases can be used as precedent for the Decision Act, one must confirm that the
case would fall under the language of the Act itself, and not in one of the areas in which
Erie is broader than the Act. Given that the current wording of the Decision Act covers all
civil actions, the cases falling within Erie but without the Decision Act are relatively few. But
cf. Tuxedo Contractors, Inc. v. Swindell-Dresser, Inc., 613 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Therefore, the majority of the cases in which state law was held to be controlling can be used
as precedent for the applicability of the Decision Act.
50. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159-61 (1983)
(Decision Act does not require a federal court to borrow state statutes of limitation in
adjudicating a federal statutory right); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173,
176 (1942) (federal court need not apply state rules of estoppel where state rules would detract
from enforcement of the federal statutory right); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States,
462 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
51. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (federal common law
controls in admiralty and maritime cases); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (case during the same term as Erie; apportionment of an interstate
stream decided under federal common law), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 668 (1938).
52. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Bank of America Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352
U.S. 29 (1956); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, reh'g denied, 357 U.S.
933 (1958).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
54. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (federal law used
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by federal common law, state law is preempted and therefore does not
apply. A federal court in such a case will apply federal common law as
fully as if the federal law were set out in the Constitution or an act of
Congress.
The final category is not found in the language of the Decision Act.
Instead, in areas of peculiarly great federal interest, courts have created an
implied exception to the mandate of the Decision Act. This federal interest
may arise in a variety of contexts. For example, it may appear in cases
presenting issues of national or international concern." In other cases, the
dispute may directly affect the rights and obligations of the United States. 6
Further, the Decision Act may not apply where there is a strong need for
uniformity in the outcome of a certain type of litigation. 7 Finally, there
may be other federal interests involved in the process or in the result of a
lawsuit that might be upset if a federal court was to use state law.58 In
these cases, federal law is applied as the "rule of decision," even though
the primary rights involved in the litigation are rights created by state law.
The court may elect to apply federal law if it fears that use of state law
will lead to an undesirable or anomalous result.5 9
2. Does the Decision Act Apply in Bankruptcy?
The Decision Act, then, does not apply in every lawsuit in the federal
courts. In fact, a majority of cases construing the Decision Act have involved
lawsuits brought to a federal court under its diversity jurisdiction.60 Because
of this emphasis on diversity, it has sometimes been stated that the Decision
Act applies only in diversity cases. 6' Accordingly, because bankruptcy courts
as the rule of decision in admiralty and maritime-areas almost exclusively within the purview
of the federal government).
55. See, e.g., Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (where outcome
of litigation is likely to affect international relations federal law must be applied).
56. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal common
law applied to lawsuit by United States to recover proceeds of federal payroll check).
57. See, e.g., Bank of America Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956) (federal
common law applied to determine due date of federal bonds, even though the United States
was not a party and could not be bound by the outcome of the litigation).
58. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), reh'g denied, 357 U.S. 933
(1958), is probably the best known case in this category. In Byrd, the Court held that the
federal interest in affording jury trials to litigants relieved the Court of the obligation to
follow the state practice of reserving the issue for the bench, although the seventh amendment
did not control under the particular facts.
59. See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion
in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 799-801
(1957).
60. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). However, the Decision Act has also been construed
in nondiversity cases. E.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
61. See, e.g., Note, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed
Test, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 823, 826 (1976).
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do not rely on diversity of citizenship to acquire subject matter jurisdiction
over a dispute, it is questionable whether the Decision Act has any real
impact in bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that the Decision Act is not confined to
diversity cases. The Decision Act on its face applies to all "civil actions";
making no distinction as to the source of federal jurisdiction. Even without
specific authorization from the Supreme Court, lower federal courts have
held that state law should control in cases in which a federal court adju-
dicates state law claims pendent or ancillary to claims involving a federal
question.62 Like a bankruptcy court, a federal court hearing a claim under
its ancillary or pendent jurisdiction is interpreting rights that arise under
state law. Furthermore, a court can usually hear the claim without regard
as to whether there is diversity of citizenship among the litigants.6 3 These
courts are correct in noting the question whether the Decision Act applies
cannot be answered simply by classifying the case as a diversity or nondiv-
ersity case. Instead, one must also consider the source of the substantive
rights adjudicated in the lawsuit.6
62. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 728 (1966) (dictum); Bi-Rite Enters.,
Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 1985); Colgate Palmolive Co. v. S/S
Dart Canada, 724 F.2d 313, 316 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 (1984); System
Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Devel. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977);
Marathon Petroleum Co. v. LoBosco, 623 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Viens v. Anthony
Co., 282 F. Supp. 983, 985 (D. Vt. 1968). See also Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313
F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1963) (dictum), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963). See also Annotation,
Modern Status of Rules as to Pendent Federal Jurisdiction over Nonfederal Claims, 5 A.L.R.
3D 1040, 1060 (1966) (while this annotation has been superceded, none of the replacement
annotations deal with the above issue). Accord Westen & Lehman, supra note 6, at 366-67.
None of the cases cited above rely exclusively upon the Decision Act as the basis for their
holding. Each is instead based at least in part on the broader Erie doctrine. As discussed supra
at note 49, however, this does not necessarily mean that the decisions are not of value in
construing the scope of the Decision Act. Indeed, because the language of the Decision Act
would appear to cover the situations presented in each of the above cases, the Decision Act
alone would have constituted sufficient authority for the holding in each case.
63. In multiparty litigation presenting certain fact situations, lack of diversity between the
litigants may serve to defeat the use of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction. In Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), the plaintiff attempted to join a federal question claim against
one defendant with a state law claim against another, nondiverse defendant. The Supreme
Court refused to allow the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, although it stated that such
jurisdiction might be proper in exceptional circumstances.
Aldinger, however, applies only when a plaintiff's sole claim against a nondiverse defendant
is a state law claim. When plaintiff alleges both a federal question claim and a related state
law claim against the same defendant, lack of diversity between the plaintiff and defendant
does not bar the exercise of jurisdiction over the state law claim. See United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The analogous doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction has been applied
to state law claims involving nondiverse parties set forth in counterclaims, cross-claims, and
third party claims. Cf. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
64. As discussed supra in text accompanying notes 17 & 18, the proper focus in bankruptcy
is on the source of the substantive rights being adjudicated in the lawsuit. One cannot simply
focus on the source of the "claim" that gave rise to the proceeding. Although the right to
bring the proceeding from the bankruptcy court may be created by the Code, the proceeding
may involve primarily state law rights.
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This conclusion is bolstered by several other federal court decisions which
apply state law in federal question cases. For example, federal courts have
applied state law as the rule of decision in interpreting state administrative
agency orders in the context of a federal antitrust claim,65 and in determining
what defenses are available in an action arising under a federal consumer
protection statute.66 In such cases, the courts have held that state law must
be applied in adjudicating all state law rights absent a contrary indication
in the underlying federal statute.67
This is not tantamount to saying that the Decision Act requires the
application of state law in all federal court litigation. A nondiversity case
will more likely invoke one of the previously described categories of excep-
tions to the Decision Act. For example, in litigation between two states, a
state and a citizen of a different state, or a state and a subdivision of that
state, the Supreme Court has indicated that state law may not apply.68
Alternatively, as previously discussed, 69 the case may involve uniquely federal
interests that remove it from the mandate of the Decision Act. It is not
lack of diversity alone, however, which removes these cases from the reach
of the Decision Act. Instead, each of the cases involves one of the categories
described previously, thereby relieving the federal court of its duty to follow
state law. In all of these situations, although the basic claim arises under
state law, the case invokes some federal interest.
Do the same considerations apply in bankruptcy? The courts have af-
forded little guidance on this issue.70 Admittedly, bankruptcy is traditionally
65. Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1022 (1982).
66. Abraham v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 795 F.2d 238, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim).
67. See supra notes 65 & 66.
68. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 310 (1984), reh'g
denied, 468 U.S. 1224 (1983); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (federal
common law governs the dispute). See generally Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits,
69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1960).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
70. But see Fore Improvement Corp. v. Selig, 278 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly,
J., concurring) (asserting that the Decision Act should apply in bankruptcy absent any
overriding federal policy).
Regardless of whether the Decision Act applies generally to all nondiversity cases, there is
language in the Supreme Court's opinion of Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green,
329 U.S. 156 (1946), which indicates that the Erie doctrine does not apply in bankruptcy. As
discussed above, if Erie does not apply in bankruptcy, the Decision Act does not either.
Vanston Bondholders, however, does not actually stand for the proposition that Erie is
irrelevant in bankruptcy. The Court did not decide that federal law determines the substantive
rights of the parties outside of bankruptcy. Instead, the Court merely held that even if the
claim for compound interest at issue in that case was valid under state law, it was not the
type of claim that would give the creditor the right to participate in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Id. at 163. The right of a creditor to participate in bankruptcy is essentially a federal right.
Although the bankruptcy court must look to state law to determine who is a "creditor," it
looks to federal law to determine if that creditor's state law claim is allowed. Because Vanston
Bondholders did not involve state law rights, it should not be read for the proposition that
Erie is inapplicable in bankruptcy.
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viewed as a uniquely federal remedy. The federal bankruptcy power is one
explicitly granted to Congress in the Constitution. 7' Although the states are
not barred by the bankruptcy clause from regulating insolvency,72 the con-
stitutional prohibition on state impairment of contracts73 greatly limits the
states' ability to grant the fundamental relief associated with bankruptcy -
the discharge of debt. Further, under the current legislative scheme, only
federal courts have jurisdiction to administer bankruptcy cases.74 These
factors indicate that the federal government does have a strong interest in
bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, this federal interest is not of sufficient magnitude to override
the Decision Act. Bankruptcy presupposes an existing network of state laws.
Essentially, bankruptcy is a mechanism for the efficient resolution of state
law claims, not a new federal body of rights and obligations supplanting
state law. Except in certain narrow areas, the Code does not require a court
to ignore state law rules.75 Even though there are federal concerns present
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
72. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), indicates that the bankruptcy
power is not exclusive. In the absence of federal legislation, the states may (and have) enacted
bankruptcy laws.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
74. The jurisdictional statutes applicable in bankruptcy are cited and discussed supra at
note 7. Under this jurisdictional scheme, virtually all of the litigation related directly to the
bankruptcy case will be conducted by a bankruptcy court. Matters that are tied less directly
to the bankruptcy case may be heard by a state court.
75. There are, of course, several instances in which the Code explicitly displaces state law
rules. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 724(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (special priority rules for tax
liens). In only one instance, however, does the Code explicitly displace state choice of law
rules. In section 522(b)(2)(A), an individual debtor is allowed to elect to use state law
exemptions. This subsection states that the applicable state law exemptions are those which
are "applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's
domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place ... ." 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982). Thus, section 522(b)(2)(A) empowers the court to ignore state
choice of law rules relating to exemptions.
The court in In re Knight, 76 Bankr. 857 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987), suggested that Congress
intended a much broader displacement of state choice of law rules in bankruptcy. Under
section 502(b)(1), a contractual claim is allowable only if it is enforceable under "applicable
law." 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The court in Knight viewed this language
as an authorization to ignore the forum's choice of law rule (under which the contract would
be illegal) in favor of "the law of the place where the contract was made" (under which the
contract was fully enforceable). 76 Bankr. at 860.
The argument is appealing on its face. As discussed infra at text accompanying notes 108-
11, Klaxon relies in large part on the Decision Act. This act, however, requires the federal
court to apply state law only when there is no federal law or treaty to the contrary. Whenever
the phrase "applicable law" appears, the argument continues, Congress has specified to the
contrary, thereby pushing the case outside of the Decision Act and Klaxon. Since the phrase
"applicable law" appears on more than forty-five occasions in the Code itself, the bankruptcy
court is free to ignore state conflicts rules in many circumstances.
Nevertheless, the argument is probably misguided. The more logical interpretation of "ap-
plicable law" is that Congress is directing the court to use nonbankruptcy substantive law
instead of bankruptcy law to resolve the issue. This directive is not the same as giving the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
in bankruptcy that are not present in diversity suits, this in and of itself
does not remove bankruptcy cases from the reach of the Decision Act.
Aside from a possible federal policy in favor of granting a discharge, there
is no overriding policy which would affect the resolution of state law issues
in a bankruptcy proceeding.7 6 In addition, unlike cases involving obligations
of the federal government, there is no pressing need for national uniformity
in the administration of the bankruptcy laws.7 7 Therefore, using state law
in bankruptcy is generally consistent with the federal statutory scheme.
Similarly, there is no overriding federal interest in the resolution of
individual bankruptcy cases. Most bankruptcy cases affect primarily the
obligations of private individuals or business entities.7 8 In areas where the
federal government does have an interest, such as federal income tax liens,
Congress has generally protected the federal government's interest through
various provisions in the Code.7 9 Accordingly, the broad federal interest in
the existence of a bankruptcy system does not authorize a wholesale sub-
stitution of federal law for state law in bankruptcy.
This is not to say that there are not instances in which bankruptcy courts
may ignore state law. Although bankruptcy is built upon a base of state
law rights, the terms and operation of bankruptcy laws are clearly a matter
within the purview of the federal government. A state may attempt to
dictate the result in a bankruptcy case by careful draftsmanship of state
law. If a state enacts a rule which is designed to obstruct the effects of the
Codes the bankruptcy court should have the power to ignore that state
law. 0 Although the states define the "web" of relationships that exist on
the date of bankruptcy, the states generally do not have the power to control
what bankruptcy does to that web.8 The federal government, not the states,
dictates the position of the various creditors following bankruptcy.82
bankruptcy court the power to ignore state conflicts rules, which are part and parcel of the
state substantive law. In addition, section 522(b)(2)(A) explicitly directs the bankruptcy courts
to use a specific forum's law. This indicates that Congress was willing to displace state choice
of law rules when it considered it to be important.
76. Hill, supra note 14, at 1047.
77. A bankruptcy proceeding involves primarily private rights. Thus, the outcome of an
issue in a bankruptcy case is not likely to have any impact beyond the parties in the case
itself. The result certainly is unlikely to affect any nationwide program. In re Lady Madonna
Indus., Inc., 76 Bankr. 281, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (no need for federal rule governing validity
of settlement agreements in bankruptcy).
78. The adjustment of a municipality's debt, as provided by chapter 9 of the Code, is
clearly an exception to this. Nevertheless, there will not be, in most instances, a strong federal
interest in the outcome of a municipal bankruptcy case.
79. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7), 724(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (special provisions
protecting the interest of the federal taxing authorities).
80. See generally Countryman, supra note 46, at 420-26. See also infra note 97.
81. A notable exception is the area of exemptions, in which Congress gave the states the
power to control whether the Code's exemption provisions apply in bankruptcy cases in that
state. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982).
82. Congress also recognized the threat that aberrant state laws pose to the federal bank-
ruptcy process. As a result, several provisions of the Code allow the bankruptcy court to
disregard certain state laws that create special rules for bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
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The federal interest in the choice of governing law may be somewhat
stronger in a case involving bankruptcy remedies. Unlike the mixed state
claims, which are rooted primarily in state law, bankruptcy remedies are
created by federal statute. Because a federal statute supplies the cause of
action, it can be argued that federal law should also be used to interpret
all aspects of that federal remedy, even the underlying state law components.
Of course, the fact that a cause of action arises under a federal statute
is not controlling. A federal court adjudicating a bankruptcy remedy is not
merely borrowing state law to "fill in the gaps" in a federal statute." State
law is relevant in bankruptcy remedies insofar as it establishes the foundation
on which the federal remedy is constructed. Although the Decision Act may
not apply in interpreting the language of the Code, it should have some
relevance in the interpretation of underlying state rights.
There is nevertheless some case authority implying that the Decision Act
is irrelevant in construing bankruptcy remedies. The Supreme Court has
indicated in several roughly analogous nonbankruptcy cases that the Decision
Act is not controlling in situations in which the primary cause of action
arises under a federal statute. The most recent of these decisions is Burks
v. Lasker.15 In Burks, the basic claim before the Court was a derivative suit
involving claims arising under several federal statutes regulating investment
advisors. s6 In order to resolve the claims, the Court had to determine whether
the directors of the corporation were authorized to terminate the suit.
Nothing in the applicable federal statutes touched upon the power of
corporate directors. Even though the cause of action arose under a federal
statute, the Court indicated that state law should normally be used to
determine the powers of corporate directors . 7
§ 541(c)(l)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (state laws which become effective only upon bankruptcy
or insolvency are ineffective to prevent interests from passing to the bankruptcy estate); 11
U.S.C. § 545(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (statutory liens which arise only upon bankruptcy or
insolvency are ineffective).
83. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), involves just such
a borrowing. In DelCostello, the Court addressed the issue of which statute of limitations to
apply to a federal labor statute which did not set forth its own limitations period. The Court
eventually chose a limitations period from a different federal statute, instead of the state
limitations period.
A "borrowing" case such as DelCostello is immediately distinguishable from the situation
facing the bankruptcy court construing a bankruptcy remedy. In the borrowing situation, state
law is relevant only because it is somewhat analogous to federal law. There is no suggestion
that state law applies of its own right. In bankruptcy, however, many of the substantive rights
to be interpreted are based upon state law.
84. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956),
reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 859 (1955); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). But
cf. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (suggesting that state law controls the nature
of the property interest held by decedent, although decisions of lower courts are not necessarily
dispositive of state law).
85. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
86. Id. at 473.
87. Id. at 477-78. This situation is similar to that facing the bankruptcy court when
adjudicating a bankruptcy remedy. In both instances, the primary right giving rise to the
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The Court in Burks, however, stopped short of holding that the federal
court must look to state law in the type of case presented by the facts of
Burks. Instead, it stated that, as a matter of policy, the federal courts
ordinarily should make a primary reference to state law in determining the
nature of the underlying state law rights. The Court went on to enumerate
various cases in which federal courts are free to ignore state law when
adjudicating a federal remedy erected upon state law. 8 Although not tech-
nically decided under the Decision Act,89 the Burks opinion implies that the
Decision Act does not control where the gravamen of a complaint is a
federal question. Instead, the Court held that federal courts in such cases
should use state law unless there is some reason to the contrary.
If the Court in Burks meant to imply the Decision Act does not control
the adjudication of state law issues germane to a federal remedy, it created
a distinction without substance. The Court could have reached the same
result by applying the Decision Act. Even if the Decision Act applies to
cases such as Burks, federal law may nevertheless be used as the rule of
decision. As discussed previously, the Court has recognized several categories
of exceptions to the application of the Decision Act. These exceptions to
the Decision Act closely parallel the situations discussed in Burks. Under
the exceptions, for example, a federal court adjudicating a claim under a
federal statute could apply federal law in lieu of state law if the federal
statute so indicated or if application of state law would frustrate the purpose
of the federal actP9 Requiring federal courts to apply state law unless certain
conditions are met is no different than "suggesting" that the courts apply
state law in the absence of those conditions. 91 In both situations, a lower
court must apply state law unless specified conditions are satisfied. There
is no language in the Decision Act creating a blanket exception for con-
gressionally created remedies. Therefore, the Decision Act and its exceptions
lawsuit is one created by Congress. The federal right, however, is premised upon the existence
of certain legal relationships that exist independent of the federal statute. These underlying
legal relationships are for the most part created and defined by state law.
88. For example, the Court indicated that the federal court could ignore state law when
the application of state law would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause
of action, or when the application of state law would destroy the right created by the federal
statute. Id. at 479.
89. The Court in Burks focused its analysis on the Erie doctrine. The technical holding of
the case is that Erie does not dictate use of state law in adjudicating a federal question. As
discussed below, however, the Decision Act is one of the foundations of the entire Erie
doctrine. Accordingly, a necessary implication of the decision in Burks is that the Decision
Act is not controlling.
90. Interestingly, the Burks Court withheld judgment on whether the state law in question
actually conflicted with the federal statute. Id. at 480.
91. Accord Note, supra note 68, at 1449-50 (1960). In De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570 (1956), reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 859 (1955), the Court indicated that the difference is
insignificant. The issue in De Sylva was whether the term "children" in the Copyright Act of
1909 includes illegimate children. The Court held that resolution of this issue "requires a
reference to state law." Id. at 580.
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should generally apply to federal remedies incorporating state law, absent
language in the federal statutes to the contrary. 92
This conclusion is reinforced in bankruptcy. First, application of state
law is entirely consistent with the Code. Congress generally intended that
resolution of state law rights would be accomplished by reference to state
law. 93 Therefore, only in rare situations will use of state law violate the
purpose of the federal statute.
The federal government, however, also has another, more basic, interest
in the bankruptcy remedies. Unlike most other claims involving state law
rights that arise in a bankruptcy case, bankruptcy remedies exist in order
to ensure that relief afforded by the Code is effective. For example, the
purpose behind the preference and fraudulent conveyance provisions of the
Code94 is to prevent debtors from improving certain creditors' positions
immediately prior to the filing of the petition. These provisions help preserve
"equality" among similarly situated creditors. Such equality is considered
basic to the bankruptcy process. 95 Therefore, to the extent state law interferes
with attainment of fundamental bankruptcy goals, bankruptcy courts may
be able to ignore the requirements of the Decision Act.
Nevertheless, even the strong federal interest in "equality" will normally
be insufficient to overcome the Decision Act. Bankruptcy remedies are
designed to protect against state laws which render ineffective the relief
provided by the Code. However, the Code itself gives bankruptcy courts
the ability to override state laws running counter to this federal interest.
Several provisions establishing bankruptcy remedies contain language which
prevents a state from avoiding the impact of the remedy by clever legisla-
tion.96 Bankruptcy courts need not look beyond these provisions for au-
thorization to defeat state attempts to control the result in bankruptcy.
When interpreting bankruptcy remedies, then, a court's task is to determine
92. The lower courts are in accord with this conclusion. A number of courts have cited
Erie as controlling in the adjudication of state law rights in bankruptcy. Woods-Tucker Leasing
Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Devel. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Busick, 719
F.2d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Citron Inv. Corp., 493 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1974); Goldstein
v. Madison Nat'l Bank, 89 Bankr. 274 (D.D.C. 1988); In re Dynamic Enterprises, Inc., 32
Bankr. 509 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Concrete Structures, Inc., 23 Bankr. 605 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1982). But cf. In re Poole, 15 Bankr. 422 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (although state
law governs an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance under section 544(b), state law
does not control on the issue of whether the bankruptcy court should issue a preliminary
injunction in the course of the section 544(b) action).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
94. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (respectively).
95. Section 545 serves a similar end. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under
section 545(I), the Code allows the trustee to avoid any statutory lien that becomes effective
only upon bankruptcy. This provision preserves equality by preventing states from favoring a
class of creditors in bankruptcy in situations where it is not willing to do so outside of
bankruptcy.
96. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under section 545, the state is
free to treat certain creditors more favorably than others. In order for the state priority rules
to stand up in bankruptcy, however, the state must also give the creditor priority over a bona
fide purchaser. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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whether the congressionally established criteria have been violated. In other
words, a court must determine the substance of a state's law before deter-
mining whether it violates one of the restrictions of the Code. In ascertaining
the content of state law, there is no reason why a bankruptcy court should
not refer to state law. Only by so doing can a bankruptcy court interpret
state law with any accuracy.97 Accordingly, the Decision Act will generally
require the bankruptcy court to use state law to resolve state law rights
germane to bankruptcy remedies. 8
3. The Decision Act and Choice of Law
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that unless some component of
federal law oi federal policy indicates otherwise, the Decision Act requires
a bankruptcy court to utilize state law when adjudicating state law rights
presented to it in a bankruptcy case. Indeed, the Act seems almost redundant
when applied in bankruptcy. If the bankruptcy process is viewed as a federal
procedure for dealing with state law, it is consistent to look beyond the
terms of the Code when determining the scope of state law rights.
The Decision Act, however, does not resolve the next issue; namely, which
state's law is to be applied. The Act speaks of applying state law as the
"rule of decision." The phrase "rule of decision," however, is not defined.
More specifically, it is unclear whether a state's choice of law rules are
rules of decision. Logically, however, the phrase should encompass a state's
entire body of law, including its choice of law rules. A state's "substantive"
rule cannot be considered a "rule of decision" unless the adjudicating court
elects to use that state's rule. if one views a state's choice of law rules as
a integral part of its "substantive" law, the mandate of the Decision Act
clearly encompasses choice of law rules.
Even if the Decision Act does require use of state choice of law rules,
however, it is silent on the methodology that federal courts must use in
selecting applicable choice of law rules. In other words, the Decision Act
does not indicate the state to which federal courts should look for applicable
97. This is not to say that state law may not interfere with the Code in areas not protected
by the bankruptcy remedies. For example, the state may attempt to "disguise" state law rights
in order to shield these rights from the trustee's avoidance powers. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d
749 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966), presents just such a case. In Elliott,
the court found that the state was attempting to disguise a statutory lien by calling it a trust.
Id. at 755. If the arrangement was a statutory lien, it would be voidable. If characterized as
a trust, funds held by the debtor would not pass to the bankruptcy trustee, but instead would
go to the "beneficiary" of the "trust." To prevent the state law from contravening the intent
of the Code, the court treated the state law rights as a lien, and subjected the arrangement to
the avoidance powers. Id.
Elliott, however, does not stand for the proposition that the bankruptcy court may ignore
state law in its entirety. Instead, Elliott simply indicates that the bankruptcy court may look
beyond the label that a state places on its law and look instead to the substance. In order to
determine these underlying substantive rights, the court should look to state law.
98. Again, one must distinguish the above analysis from the analysis of which state's law
is to be applied. This latter question presents additional considerations which are the subject
of the remainder of this article.
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choice of law rules. In moving to the realm of choice of law, one must
transcend the strict limits of the Decision Act. The most important body
of law dealing with choice of law in federal courts is the Klaxon arm of
the Erie doctrine. The Klaxon rule determines the manner in which federal
courts are to decide a choice of law question in cases governed by the Erie
doctrine. The Erie doctrine, however, is based in large part upon the
Decision Act.99 Therefore, the discussion of the Decision Act remains highly
relevant even in considering the impact of the Klaxon rule.
C. Transforming the Decision Act into Klaxon
As already indicated, many of the rights adjudicated by a bankruptcy
court arise under state law. If those same rights were presented to a diversity
court for adjudication, resolution of the choice of law question would be
clear. Under the rule set out by the Supreme Court in Klaxon'0 and the
companion case of Griffin v. McCoach,"°" a diversity court is required to
adopt forum choice of law rules. Because a bankruptcy court is also a
federal court, the question of which state law is to be used in deciding state
law rights in bankruptcy cannot be resolved without determining the appli-
cability of Klaxon. The crux of the Klaxon rule is that the mandate of
Erie'02 extends not only to a state's substantive law but also to state choice
of law rules. 03 If courts of the forum state would apply the law of State
99. See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
100. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
101. 313 U.S. 498 (1941). For the sake of convenience, the doctrine set out in the Klaxon
and Griffin opinions will be referred to as the Klaxon doctrine.
102. The procedural history of Erie itself presented the Supreme Court with a choice of law
issue. The accident giving rise to the Erie litigation occurred in Pennsylvania. The lawsuit itself
was filed in the Southern District of New York. After reversing the lower courts' use of
"general federal common law" to decide the substantive rights of the litigants, Justice Brandeis'
majority opinion stated that the liability of the Erie Railroad should have been determined in
accordance with Pennsylvania common law. 304 U.S. at 71.
This conclusion is not immediately obvious. Indeed, the general rule announced in Erie
could easily be interpreted to require the lower court to apply the substantive law of the forum
state - New York. The opinion does not state why Pennsylvania instead of New York law
should govern. Various theories have been suggested as to why Justice Brandeis neglected to
discuss this aspect of the holding. Compare Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLTM. L. REv. 489, 514 n.84 (1954)(the majority in Erie must have assumed that
federal law governed the choice of law question) with Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of
the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 383, 401 (1964)(the Court must have
assumed, without so stating, that a New York court in these circumstances would have applied
Pennsylvania substantive law to the issue).
103. Earlier in its 1940-1941 term, the Court issued an opinion which suggested just the
contrary. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1 (1940), a party was challenging the
validity of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, which authorizes the district court to order a
party to submit to a mental or physical examination. The Court held that the Rule was valid.
Id. at 16. It further suggested, however, that, in the absence of the Federal Rule, the Decision
Act would require the district court to look to the law of the state where the cause of action
arose (Indiana) for the governing substantive law. The Court never discussed what the conflict
of law rules of the forum state (Illinois) would require. Id. at 10-11. Therefore, the Court
intimated that the choice-of-law question could be decided without reference to forum law.
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A in deciding a dispute, a diversity court must do the same. The diversity
court is not free to choose for itself which state has the most significant
nexus with the underlying dispute.
Neither Klaxon nor Griffin shed much light on the reason for extending
the rule in Erie to the conflicts issue. Instead, the Court in each opinion
simply held that the Erie doctrine applies with equal force in the choice of
laws area.1 4 In so holding, the Court stated that the central theme underlying
Erie is uniformity between the state and diversity courts situated within a
given jurisdiction.0 5 To ensure uniformity of result, a federal district court
must. apply the substantive law that would be applied by a court of the
forum state. Under Erie and Klaxon, then, a diversity court acts as merely
another state court.10
6
The Klaxon rule has generally been interpreted in the context of diversity
cases. Nevertheless, a substantial number of bankruptcy courts have deter-
mined that the rule also applies in bankruptcy cases.107 This conclusion is
not immediately obvious. Even though the Decision Act applies to the
adjudication of state law rights in bankruptcy, the Klaxon rule is not a
necessary implication of the Decision Act. The Decision Act is silent on the
choice of law question. The Klaxon rule, then, although based in part upon
the Decision Act, also involves other considerations relevant to state law
litigation in federal courts. To determine the extent to which Klaxon applies
in bankruptcy, one must separate the rule into its component parts. Any
discussion of the Klaxon rule begins with an understanding of Erie and its
precepts.
1. The Decision Act
Aside from its constitutional aspects, Erie can be interpreted simply as a
decision construing the reach of the Decision Act. Thus construed, Erie
holds that the rule of Swift v. Tyson'05 incorrectly restricts the reach of the
104. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496; Griffin, 313 U.S. at 503. This dearth of discussion has
subjected Klaxon and Griffin to a great deal of criticism. Perhaps the strongest criticism is
that levied in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 49, at 794-800 (describing Klaxon as a "rather
simplistic extension of Erie . . ."). See also Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice
of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS. No. 2, 105 (Spr. 1977);
Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L. REv. 1191, 1200-
10 (1967). For a defense of Klaxon, see Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 693, 714-15 n.125 (1974).
Although the rule has been widely criticized, the Supreme Court has shown no inclination
to reconsider it. Indeed, the Klaxon rule was held controlling in Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v.
Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). In Challoner, the Court held that the district court must apply
the forum's choice-of-law rule, even though this meant that the substantive law of Cambodia
would govern the dispute between the parties instead of the substantive law of Texas. Id. at
5.
105. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. This "uniformity" logic also underlies the Supreme Court's
later opinions in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
106. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
107. See cases cited supra notes 42 & 43.
108. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
[Vol. 42
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss4/10
19891 CHOICE OF LAW RULES IN BANKRUPTCY 559
Decision Act to actions arising under state statutes.' °9 By extending the
scope of the Act to actions at common law, Erie stands for the proposition
that Congress has ordered federal courts to follow state law whenever state
law rights are adjudicated.
Even though the Decision Act forms one of the foundations of Erie, it
is unclear whether the Act supports the Court's extension of the Erie doctrine
in Klaxon. The opinions in Klaxon and Griffin do not mention the Decision
Act as a basis for the rule. The logic underlying the decisions, however,
indicates that the Decision Act does require the use of state choice of law
rules. A key element of the Klaxon holding is the notion that the choice of
law rules of a state are part and parcel of the substantive rights afforded
litigants under the laws of that state."10 This conclusion is also extremely
useful in interpreting the Decision Act. Because the Decision Act requires
that state-created rights be adjudicated in accordance with state law, it
concords fully with the result in Klaxon."' Klaxon implies that "rules of
decision" a federal court must apply under the Decision Act include those
rules used by state courts in selecting a body of law to adjudicate the
controversy. Therefore, Klaxon can be read as an important interpretation
of the Decision Act.
2. The Constitution
The majority opinion in Erie clearly indicates that the decision was based
in part upon the Constitution. For reasons that have puzzled students and
scholars alike, Justice Brandeis' majority opinion in Erie suggests that the
abandoned rule of Swift was not only wrong, but also in violation of the
Constitution." 2 Unfortunately, Brandeis' opinion in Erie does not specify
the provision of the Constitution that was violated by the then prevailing
practice in federal courts."3 Today, fifty years after the Erie decision, most
have concluded that Brandeis believed the federal courts, in creating a
109. Indeed, Justice Reed, concurring in the Erie opinion, indicated that the decision should
have been confined to the Decision Act issue. 304 U.S. at 91-92 (Reed, J., concurring).
110. This rationale is expressed with the greatest emphasis in Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S.
at 504.
111. Accord Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon
Problem, TtE AMR icAN LAW INsTrrTE, STUDy OF THE DrvISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 154 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1963).
112. 304 U.S. at 79.
113. The majority opinion states, "We merely declare that in applying the doctrine [of Swift
v. Tyson] this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are
reserved by the Constitution to the several states." 304 U.S. at 80. Because of the failure of
the Erie majority to specify an explicit provision, the constitutional discussion in Erie has
often been dismissed as mere dictum. See, e.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946); Currie, Change
of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. Rav. 405, 468-69 (1955). The better view
is that the Court meant what it said, and that, under the facts of Erie itself, ignoring state
substantive law would violate some express or implied restriction of the Constitution. See Ely,
supra note 104 at 702-03 n.59; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution (Part I), 53 Nw.
U.L. Rv. 427, 439-49 (1958); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 52-54 (1982).
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general federal common law under Swift, were acting outside the enumerated
powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution.,"4 Nothing
in the Constitution gives federal courts the power to create, through adju-
dication, general substantive rules of common law to govern private, state
law disputes. Further, none of the powers granted to Congress would
authorize the enactment of a general scheme of common law rules."' Because
federal courts have no inherent constitutional authority to create federal
common law, and because Congress could not have delegated to the federal
courts a general lawmaking authority which Congress did not have itself,
Swift's interpretation of the Decision Act allowed federal courts to exceed
their constitutional powers."
6
After Erie, the Supreme Court used the constitutional argument on only
rare occasions." 7 Nevertheless, the Court dusted the argument off in the
important decision of Hanna v. Plumer."8 Hanna reinforced the view that
the federal government is one of limited powers, and that an attempt to
create substantive law in areas outside the enumerated powers of the Con-
stitution will not be allowed.
Although Hanna revived the constitutional argument of Erie, it also
recognized the argument's limits. One can infer from the Hanna opinion
that the constitutional argument of Erie may not apply to choice of law
rules enacted for use in bankruptcy. The Constitution does not authorize
114. Ely, supra note 104, at 702-04. Other interpretations of Erie's "constitutional" aspect
are possible. For example, Justice Brandeis indicates that the then-current interpretation of
Swift "rendered impossible equal protection of the law." 304 U.S. at 75. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to view Erie as a decision based upon the equal protection clause. See generally P.
Low & J. JEFFRE s, FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONs 272-75
(1987).
115. Ely, supra note 104, at 704. Professor Ely also notes that the specific issue in Erie -
the degree of negligence necessary to confer liability on the defendant - was probably within
the purview of Congress, even given the somewhat restrictive interpretation of the commerce
clause powers in effect in 1938. Id. at 703 n.62. This, however, does not affect Justice Brandeis'
analysis. The real issue is whether Congress has general lawmaking authority - which may in
turn be delegated to the federal courts. Id.
116. Id. at 704.
117. The next Supreme Court case in which the argument appears is Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co.,* 350 U.S. 198 (1956); the constitutional argument is mentioned in dictum. As noted by
Professor Ely, Bernhardt confused the constitutional argument of Erie by suggesting that a
general federal common law would invade a realm of authority reserved to the states. Ely,
supra note 104, at 705-06 (noting Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202).
Even if this argument did correctly represent the Court's view, subsequent decisions have
rendered the argument of little force. The cornerstone of this theory - that there is an "enclave"
of powers reserved to the states by the Constitution - has been rejected by the Court in recent
years. Although the notion was rescusitated briefly in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), it was again laid to rest in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985). Consequently, one need look no further than the powers explicitly granted
to the federal government in the constitution itself, augmented by those implied powers that
are "necessary and proper" to implement one of the enumerated powers, in order to determine
what is within the permissible scope of federal activity. See also P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, supra
note 114, at 273-74.
118. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss4/10
1989] CHOICE OF LAW RULES IN BANKRUPTCY 561
Congress to replace state tort law with federal law. It does, however, grant
Congress the power to enact bankruptcy laws."19 In addition, article I and
article III of the Constitution enable Congress to establish lower federal
courts.' 20 The "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution 2' author-
izes Congress to enact those laws needed for the proper exercise of Congress'
enumerated powers. Therefore, Congress certainly has the power to enact
a system of bankruptcy courts to give effect to the bankruptcy laws.
1
2
Because Congress has the power to create bankruptcy courts, it also has
the implied power to establish, either directly or by delegation to the courts
themselves, rules of procedure to be utilized by those courts. If establishing
federal choice of law rules falls within the federal power to regulate the
procedure of the bankruptcy courts, it follows that the constitutional element
of Erie and Klaxon would not apply.
Unfortunately, this question cannot be easily answered. It is unclear
whether Congress' power to establish a system of courts pursuant to an
article I of the Constitution includes the power to dictate a set of choice
of law rules for those courts. 23 There is an outer limit on Congress' ability
to enact legislation under the bankruptcy power. The parameters of the
article I bankruptcy power, however, have never been clearly defined.'
24
119. Id. at 471-72.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
122. Technically, the Bankruptcy Courts are not "pure" legislative courts. Northern Pipeline
Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63 (1982). Accordingly, they differ from
the territorial courts, which were created for the purpose of implementing Congress' article I
power to govern the territories. Instead, the Bankruptcy Courts lie in a gray area between
article I courts and article III courts; they are vested with certain duties under each article.
This distinction does not affect the above analysis. The "necessary and proper" clause is not
limited to Congress' article I powers, but also applies to "all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
123. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 49, at 794, suggests that even if the issue of substantive
law presented in Erie was beyond the power of Congress, Congress could nevertheless enact
choice of law rules for the federal courts, which would apply even in diversity cases. These
authors argue that Congress has the authority to enact choice of law rules as necessary and
proper either to the full faith and credit clause or to Congress' article I power to establish a
system of federal courts. In other words, the power to establish a system of lower federal
courts includes the power to regulate all aspects of procedure in those courts, including choice
of law rules. Accord Friendly, supra note 102, at 402.
Likewise, even if Congress does not have the ability to enact choice of law rules, it has
been suggested that the Supreme Court may have an implied power to do so as part of its
power to administer the lower federal courts. Memorandum, The Constitutionality of Author-
izing Independent Federal Determination of Choice of Law in Diversity of Citizenship Cases,
AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 442, 443-48 (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY]; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the
Constitution (Part II), 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 565 (1958). Taken together, these arguments
imply that the constitutional underpinnings of Erie cannot be used to support the result in
Klaxon. Accord Cavers, supra note 111, at 154.
124. The Supreme Court has on only two occasions found that a federal law exceeded
Congress' article I bankruptcy power. In Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement
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Even given the limited precedent, it is reasonable to conclude that Con-
gress has the power to establish choice of law rules for federal courts. The
Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts that the "necessary and
proper" clause gives Congress significant latitude in regulating procedure in
federal courts established pursuant to article III of the Constitution.
12
Therefore, to the extent the choice of law issue is one of procedure, Congress
could arguably rely upon the necessary and proper clause to enact choice
of law rules for bankruptcy courts created under its article I power. These
choice of law rules would not violate the Constitution merely because they
substitute a uniform set of conflicts rules for existing state rules. If Congress
has the power to enact a law on a given subject, it also has the power to
displace state law on that subject. 26 The constitutional underpinnings of
Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), the Court held unconstitutional that portion of the 1898
Bankruptcy Act pertaining to municipal bankruptcies, stating that it was an encroachment on
state powers. The Court later retreated from this position in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S.
27 (1938). Since Bekins, the Court has retreated even further from the notion of an "enclave"
of powers reserved exclusively to the states. See supra note 117. Therefore, it is highly
questionable whether Ashton is still valid.
More recently, in Railway Labor Executives' Assoc. v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982), the
Court invalidated the Rock Island Transition and Employee Assistance Act, which had a direct
impact on the pending liquidation of the defunct Rock Island Railroad. Because this act
applied only to a single debtor, it violated the "uniformity" requirement of article 1, section
8 of the Constitution. Id. at 473. For a criticism of Gibbons, see Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure
and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 THE SUP. CT. REv.
25, 26-36.
In addition to these decisions, the Court has invalidated bankruptcy laws on constitutional
grounds in only four other instances. One of these is the celebrated Northern Pipeline decision,
in which the Court held that the Code's broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the
newly-created Bankruptcy Courts was unconstitutional. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982). The crux of the decision, however, was
article III and the doctrine of separation of powers. The other three cases deal with more
technical issues. In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935),
the Court held that a provision of the Frazier-Lemke Act violated the fifth amendment. In
Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989), the Court
held that the provisions giving the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over claims against the states
could, in certain circumstances, violate the eleventh amendment. Finally, in Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989), the Court held that the provisions of the Judicial
Code governing the right to a jury trial in bankruptcy were inconsistent with the requirements
of the seventh amendment. These decisions indicate that Congress cannot use its bankruptcy
power to violate other restrictions of the Constitution. As such, they are not terribly helpful
in defining the theoretical scope of the bankruptcy power itself. This leaves Gibbons as the
only Supreme Court decision pronouncing an outer limit on the bankruptcy power.
Because of this paucity of material, the actual scope of Congress' power to enact bankruptcy
laws is unclear. For a general discussion of some of the possible limits of the bankruptcy
power, see Hill, supra note 14, at 1036-38.
125. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) (if a statute is "rationally
capable of classification" as a procedural rule, it is necessary and proper for implementing
Congress' power to establish federal courts); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
126. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See generally Westen & Lehman, supra note 6, at 314-15.
Even if Klaxon applies in bankruptcy, Congress would nevertheless have some control over
the choice of law question. Klaxon requires the federal court to refer to the choice of law
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Erie do not apply when Congress has spoken on the subject. Instead, the
constitutional aspects of Erie are based on a fear that the federal courts
were creating law in an area in which the federal government was not
empowered to act. Assuming, then, that Congress' choice of law rules do
not violate some other provision of the Constitution, 27 they would override
any constitutional considerations that might arise from Erie.
Accordingly, Congress could enact choice of law rules for the bankruptcy
courts without exceeding the scope of its enumerated powers. Applying the
Erie logic, nothing in the Constitution prevents the bankruptcy courts from
establishing choice of law rules in the context of adjudicating a bankruptcy
case. The court's inherent power to formulate such rules crises from their
power to regulate their own procedure. The only restrictions on bankruptcy
courts' ability to formulate choice of law rules come not from the Consti-
tution, but instead from Congress. Therefore, the constitutional underpin-
nings of Erie would not prohibit federal choice of lav rules in the bankruptcy
courts.121
rules of the forum. Assuming that Congress could find a state whose choice of law rules were
in accordance with Congress' desires, it could dictate the use of the preferred rules by altering
the venue statutes to require all cases to be brought in that forum. This venue rule would be
valid as long as it did not violate the litigants' fifth amendment due process rights. See infra
note 127.
It is unlikely, however, that Congress could, under its bankruptcy power, enact a Code of
substantive legal rules that would replace all state rules of decision in a bankruptcy case.
Conceptually, bankruptcy is a federal system built upon an existing network of state lav (and
nonbankruptcy federal law) rights. Accordingly, Congress does have the power to displace
state law when that state law is inconsistent with the purposes of bankruptcy. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 545(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (statutory liens that become effective only upon
bankruptcy or insolvency may be avoided). This ability to displace statd law would not warrant
a wholesale substitution of federal substantive law for the entire underlying web of state law
rights. Most state laws are fully consistent with the purposes behind the Code.
127. For example, the Supreme Court has indicated that an arbitrary choice of law rule
may violate the due process rights of the litigants. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 823 (1985). Phillips dealt with a lawsuit originally adjudicated in a state court; thus, it is
not clear whether it is applicable to litigation in the federal courts. The Court's rationale was
based in part on the full faith and credit clause. In addition, in its discussion of due process,
the applicable constitutional provision was the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 814-23. The federal courts are bound by neither the full faith and credit clause nor the
fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, the federal government is required to afford citizens due
process under the fifth amendment. Although the fifth amendment restrictions may not exactly
parallel those of the fourteenth amendment, there should be similar considerations. Cf.
Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,
79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 14-17 (1984). For example, a choice of law system would arguably run
afoul of due process limitations (either the fifth or fourteenth amendment) if it was completely
arbitrary or if the system consistently chose the substantive law of a forum having no
connections whatsoever with the underlying dispute. Therefore, to the extent that the decision
in Phillips relies upon due process considerations, it indicates that any national choice of law
rule adopted by Congress for use in the bankruptcy courts would have to afford due process
to the litigants.
128. In theory, Congress could deprive the federal courts of all authority to control their
own procedure. To date, Congress has not chosen to do so.
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3. Forum Shopping
As further justification for its conclusion, the majority opinion in Erie
expressed concern that the rule in Swift provided an incentive for plaintiffs
to control the outcome of a lawsuit by choosing between the federal and
state courts in a jurisdiction. 29 Indeed, as the Court expounded upon the
Erie doctrine in later cases, the fear of "forum shopping" emerged as the
primary justification for the doctrine. 10 Forum shopping could exist when-
ever the outcome in federal court would be materially different than the
outcome in state court. The federal courts could avoid the specter of forum
shopping only by copying the state courts' application of substantive law.
The decision in Klaxon is fully consistent with this goal of avoiding forum
shopping. A plaintiff may have an incentive to forum shop if a federal
court will decide the case under a different body of substantive law than
the courts of the forum. This threat of forum shopping exists not only in
those situations where a federal court is considering using federal law instead
of forum law. A federal court may also induce forum shopping if it applies
the law of state A in cases where the state courts would apply the law of
state B. In either situation, plaintiffs may have some control over the
outcome of the litigation depending on their selection of a federal or state
forum. Klaxon restricts forum shopping by requiring a federal court to look
not only to state "substantive" law, but also to state choice of law rules.
Therefore, a defendant is assured that the substantive rules of decision
applied in any litigation in the forum will be identical regardless of the
court chosen. With the addition of the Klaxon rule, a federal court inter-
preting state law rights must act for all intents and purposes as a state
court.
Klaxon, then, is based upon two of the three concepts underlying Erie.
Although these concepts are related, they each affect the scope of the
Klaxon rule in a distinct way. In other words, each of these underlying
concepts provides the justification for a different part of the entire rule in
Klaxon. Therefore, Klaxon will dictate the resolution of the choice of law
issue in bankruptcy cases only to the extent that each of these underlying
concepts applies in bankruptcy.
129. Erie, 304 U.S. at 76-77.
130. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Actually, the Court in Hanna viewed Erie as
having "twin aims": (1) discouraging forum shopping; and (2) avoiding "inequitable admin-
istration of the laws." 380 U.S. at 468. For the purposes of this discussion, it is unnecessary
to determine what difference exists - if any - between the former aim and the latter. Indeed,
as Professor Ely points out, forum shopping in and of itself is not evil. Forum shopping only
becomes objectionable when it results in discrimination in favor of or against out-of-state
litigants. Ely, supra note 104, at 710. Therefore, there is no practical difference between the
"twin aims" set out by the Hanna Court. See also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S.
Ct. 2239 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The best explanation of what constitutes inequitable
administration of the laws is that found in Erie itself: allowing an unfair discrimination between
noncitizens and citizens of the forum state.").
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IF. The Application of Klaxon in Bankruptcy
Nothing in the Klaxon or the Griffin opinions indicates that the rule
created in those cases is controlling on the choice of law rules that are to
be used by a bankruptcy court. In both cases, the Court explicitly restricted
its holding to federal district courts sitting in diversity., Because bankruptcy
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over bankruptcy-related disputes
regardless of the existence of diversity of citizenship between any of the
litigants,3 2 a bankruptcy court technically falls outside the Klaxon rule. 33
This approach is overly simplistic. As discussed previously, 34 the Decision
Act applies in nondiversity situations. Similarly, the Supreme Court has
never held that Klaxon applies only in diversity cases. 35 Therefore, when
state law rights are presented to a bankruptcy court in a bankruptcy case,
one can make an argument that Klaxon should apply. More specifically, to
the extent that the justifications underlying the Klaxon doctrine apply in a
case involving state law rights in the bankruptcy court, Klaxon may control
the choice of law question in bankruptcy.
A. The Decision Act Component
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, 36 the Decision
131. In the opening sentence of Klaxon, Justice Reed stated the issue as "whether in diversity
cases the federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states in which
they sit." 313 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added). See also Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferran
& Co., 383 F.2d 46, 56 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968) (Klaxon inapplicable
in admiralty litigation).
132. Under the provisions defining the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts,
discussed supra note 7, the bankruptcy courts may hear disputes related to a bankruptcy case
regardless of the citizenship of the litigants. This expansive jurisdiction is much greater than
that provided under the Act. Under the Act, the federal courts had bankruptcy jurisdiction
only over "summary" proceedings. If an issue was not "summary," it was a "plenary" issue,
which could be adjudicated by the federal courts only if there existed an independent basis
for subject matter jurisdiction. Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Is It Too Summary?, 39 S.
CAL. L. REv. 78, 79-80 (1966). In most cases, this meant that a plenary dispute could be
litigated in federal court only if there was complete diversity between the litigants.
Diversity courts adjudicating plenary suits generally cited Klaxon as controlling the choice
of law question. See Davidge v. White, 377 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Flying
W Airways, 341 F. Supp. 26, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Holford v. Leonard, 355 F. Supp. 261, 263
(W.D. Va. 1973).
133. A few bankruptcy courts have relied on this distinction to declare that Klaxon is
irrelevant in cases adjudicated under a federal court's bankruptcy jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re
Crist, 632 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981); In re Wallace Lincoln
Mercury Co., 469 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1972) (dictum); In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 419
F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1969); In re Eli Witt Co., 12 Bankr. 757 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); In re
Duplan Corp., 455 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). As discussed above in the text accompanying
notes 41-43, the majority of courts do not draw this distinction.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
135. In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.8 (1966), and D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456, the Court withheld judgment on the issue of
whether Klaxon applies in nondiversity cases. See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 49, at
959.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 84-92.
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Act surely applies to bankruptcy proceedings, at least to the extent that the
proceeding involves state law rights. 3 7 It follows that those portions of the
Klaxon rule which rely upon the mandate of the Decision Act should apply
equally in bankruptcy. Klaxon is highly relevant to the Decision Act ques-
tion, insofar as it holds that state "substantive" law includes state choice
of law rules. Therefore, whenever a bankruptcy court uses state law to
decide an issue, it should also look to state choice of law rules to determine
which state's law to apply. Unless a bankruptcy court reaches a result
consistent with the result that a state court would reach, it is not truly
adjudicating state law rights.
B. Forum Shopping
The decision in Klaxon is based in large part upon the fear of forum
shopping. If plaintiffs may affect the outcome of the litigation by their
judicious selection of a federal forum or state forum, the plaintiffs would
have an advantage not available to plaintiffs in a nondiversity case. In order
to avoid this inequity, federal courts must act as state courts with respect
to matters likely to result in forum shopping. Because the same threat of
forum shopping exists in bankruptcy, it lends support to the theory that
the Klaxon rule applies in bankruptcy courts.
1. Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy?
On first impression, bankruptcy does not seem to present any real op-
portunities for forum shopping. After all, bankruptcy courts have a much
higher entry cost: the filing of a bankruptcy petition and its attendant costs.
Debtors filing a Chapter 7 petition must relinquish control of all of their
nonexempt assets to a trustee, 3 ' and submit, under oath, to interrogation
by their creditors. 3 9 In this respect, litigating a dispute in the bankruptcy
courts differs substantially from litigation in the diversity courts. Litigants
in diversity cases are in basically the same situation they would face had
they tried the matter in state court.140
137. The argument that the Decision Act is inapplicable in bankruptcy was stronger prior
to its 1948 amendment. Prior to 1948, the Decision Act applied only to actions at common
law. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940). In 1948,
the Decision Act was amended to cover all "civil actions." See supra note 47. Because a
bankruptcy proceeding is traditionally considered an action in equity (even though the under-
lying claim may be a common law claim), Hill, supra note 14, at 1020-24, a textual argument
existed against application of the Decision Act to bankruptcy prior to the 1948 amendment,
Subsequent to the 1948 amendment, this textual argument is not available. A bankruptcy
proceeding is clearly a "civil action" within the meaning of the Decision Act.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Although the trustee has the power to exercise
control over all of the debtor's assets, including exempt assets, the trustee as a practical matter
will normally allow the debtor to claim his exemptions before turning over the remainder.
139. Section 343 of the Code requires a debtor to attend the meeting of the creditors and
submit to an examination under oath. 11 U.S.C. § 343 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
140. There may be minor differences between state court cases and diversity cases, e.g.,
respective filing fees or methods of service.
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Nevertheless, forum shopping in the bankruptcy courts is a viable option
for a significant number of litigants.' 4' First, bankruptcy does not necessarily
wreak havoc upon the financial affairs of debtors. Indeed, if the debtors
meet certain requirements, they may qualify for relief under Chapter 13,
under which they retain possession and control of most of their prepetition
property.
42
Second, even if debtors must subject themselves to the time and expense
of a bankruptcy proceeding, there are incentives to do so. Take, for example,
a debtor facing an unliquidated claim for damages. The substantive rules
governing the measure of damages may differ significantly in different states.
If the claim is of a sufficient magnitude, and if the bankruptcy court would
apply a different substantive law to the dispute than would the courts of
the state of debtor's residence, the debtor will have an incentive or disin-
centive to have a bankruptcy court adjudicate the dispute. In this situation,
the law chosen by the adjudicating court could have a substantial financial
impact on the debtor. 43 The costs and other sacrifices associated with
141. This is the central theme of the works cited supra at note 4. But cf. 4A COLLIBR ON
BANKRUPTCY 70.07, at 88-89 n.8 (L. King 14th ed. 1976) (arguing that the possibility of
forum shopping would not justify a rule which curbed resort to the bankruptcy process).
142. Under section 1306(b), the debtor generally retains control of all property of the estate
during the course of the chapter 13 case. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1982). From a practical
standpoint, this is one of the crucial differences between chapters 13 and 7. In chapter 7, all
of the debtor's interests in property pass to the trustee upon the filing of the petition. 11
U.S.C. § 542(a) (1982). Unless the property is abandoned back to the debtor under section
554, the debtor will lose all possessory rights in nonexempt property. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
The debtor may also retain control of her property in a case under chapter 11. In chapter
11, the debtor may continue to operate the property as a debtor in possession unless the court
appoints a trustee, or an examiner with the right to possess the property. See 11 U.S.C. §§
1104, 1106, 1107 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
143. Other attributes of the Code also create incentives to forum shop. For example, a
creditor might have a lien in an important piece of the debtor's equipment that is properly
perfected under the law of state A, but not the law of state B. If the debtor can obtain the
advantages of the law of state B by filing for bankruptcy, the difference in choice of law rules
may result in forum shopping.
In essence, the debtor in this situation is using bankruptcy to "preempt" a lawsuit or
foreclosure action by the creditor. A bankruptcy court might frown upon this use of the
bankruptcy process. Because the debtor is making use of bankruptcy solely to avoid the effect
of state law, the bankruptcy court in a chapter 7 case might deem this an "abuse" of
bankruptcy, and dismiss the petition under the aegis of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). If the bankruptcy court can dismiss the case under section 707(b), it could possibly
exert some control over forum shopping.
The foregoing situation, however, does not fall under section 707(b). This section was
enacted in order to prevent debtors from using chapter 7 in an abusive fashion. It was not
designed to deal with the situation in which the debtor's use of bankruptcy itself is abusive.
As such, section 707(b) has primarily been applied to debtors who opt for chapter 7 relief
even though their anticipated income would be more than sufficient to fund substantial
repayment under a chapter 13 plan. In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Kress,
57 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Day, 77 Bankr. 225 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987). See
also Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the
Basis of "Substantial Abuse", 59 AMR. BANKR. L.J. 327, 344 (1985). But cf. In re Bruno,
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bankruptcy might well be worth the potential savings that would result from
the application of the more favorable choice of law rules.
Therefore, forum shopping in bankruptcy is a real possibility. Assuming
that state law does govern an issue, a debtor may have an incentive to have
a claim adjudicated in a bankruptcy court if there is a significant likelihood
of a more favorable result.'"
2. Why Forum Shopping is Relevant to the Klaxon Rule
The rule in Klaxon is based both upon the Decision Act and the likelihood
of forum shopping. Taken together, these elements support a rule requiring
federal district courts sitting in diversity to apply the choice of law rules of
the forum state. The same logic is also apposite to a degree in bankruptcy.
A bankruptcy court can prevent forum shopping between it and the state
courts of that forum only if it follows the state courtos choice of governing
substantive law. Therefore, Klaxon arguably dictates the use of forum
conflicts rules in bankruptcy proceedings.
Before reaching this conclusion, however, one should examine the effect
of the Decision Act and forum shopping on the Klaxon rule. Taken alone,
the Decision Act does not require a rule as strict as that set out in Klaxon.
Although the Decision Act requires federal courts to utilize the entire body
of state law as the rule of decision, the Act does not mandate that the state
law applied be that of the forum. 4 Instead, a federal court could satisfy
the constraints of the Decision Act merely by applying the substantive law
of any given state, assuming the substantive law was chosen under state
choice of law rules.'" The fundamental purpose of the Decision Act is to
68 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (debtor convicted of murdering spouse; a bankruptcy
filing attempting to discharge loans made by parents and grandparents for bail money and
expenses for spouse's funeral held to be an "abuse"). Therefore, section 707(b) will generally
be of little use in controlling forum shopping.
144. There are also incentives for a creditor to shop between a bankruptcy court and state
courts. The creditor may, of course, force the debtor into bankruptcy by filing an involuntary
petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For all practical purposes,
however, most creditors will be less disposed to forum shop by forcing the debtor into
bankruptcy. First, because of the requirements of section 303, involuntary bankruptcy requires
the cooperation of at least one creditor who is not fully secured. Therefore, in the typical
situation where the debtor's assets are insufficient to pay all creditors in full, at least one of
the filing creditors will not receive full satisfaction of its claim. If the unsecured or undersecured
.creditor proceeds immediately under state law, however, it may recover a much larger percentage
of its claim. Second, unless the debtor has fewer than 12 "creditors" (as limited by section
303), the creditor must locate two others who are willing to force the debtor into bankruptcy
court. Third, unlike the case of a voluntary petition, a case involving an involuntary petition
may be dismissed upon a showing that the debtor is paying his debts as they become due. See
11 U.S.C, § 303(h)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). These factors tend to offset any advantage
that might exist from the availability of the more favorable law.
145. It has been argued that Congress could render any such rule ineffective by creating
district courts with jurisdiction over territory in two or more states. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 49, at 794.
146. The constitutional considerations underlying Erie do not support the Klaxon rule. See
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prevent federal courts from usurping the role of the states by creating a
generally applicable federal common law. The Act goes no further. Although
expressing a marked preference for state law over federal law, the Decision
Act does not require federal courts to look at the laws of any particular
state.
47
It is because of the additional consideration of forum shopping that
Klaxon requires reference to forum choice of law rules. The entire Erie
doctrine is concerned with "vertical" forum shopping; that is, shopping
between the state and federal courts within a given jurisdiction. Once the
concern with forum shopping is fused with the requirements of the Decision
Act, it becomes important for federal courts to apply forum law. Klaxon
plays an important role in this scheme because it requires federal courts to
apply the same substantive law as would a forum court. If a federal court
was free to select a substantive law different than that which would be
chosen by the courts of the forum, forum shopping would still present a
threat.
C. The Considerations of Klaxon as Applied to Bankruptcy
The Decision Act is broad enough to cover proceedings in bankruptcy
courts. Therefore, bankruptcy courts are obligated to use state law when
adjudicating state law claims. 4 As one might expect, this theory reflects
current practice in the bankruptcy courts. Even without mentioning the
Decision Act, several Supreme Court cases make it clear that bankruptcy
courts are to apply state law to determine state-created rights in the absence
of a federal statute.1
49
Similarly, bankruptcy courts should be required to look at the entire body
of state law, including state choice of law rules. This portion of the Klaxon
rule, stemming from the Decision Act, applies with equal force in bank-
ruptcy. There is nothing unique about the federal process of bankruptcy
that authorizes a court to ignore state choice of law rules when considering
state law rights. Indeed, a party cannot be said to have a "right" under
the law of state A unless some court would apply the law of A to litigation
involving that purported right. The Decision Act therefore requires bank-
ruptcy courts to adopt both state substantive law and state choice of law
rules as an integral part of state substantive law.
It is in the realm of forum shopping, however, that the situation in
bankruptcy differs. Forum shopping between bankruptcy courts and state
supra text accompanying notes 112-28. Nevertheless, even if the Constitution does apply, it
requires no more of the court than to apply state instead of federal law. The constitutional
argument does not necessarily imply that the state law be that of the forum.
147. The court cannot be arbitrary in its choice of a substantive law. The due process clause
of the fifth amendment sets limits on the federal courts' power to apply the law of a state
with no connections whatsoever with the underlying dispute. See supra note 127.
148. The case of the bankruptcy remedies presents special concerns. See discussion infra at
text accompanying notes 179-82.
149. See cases cited supra note 15.
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courts based on differing choice of law rules is a possibility. The mere
possibility of forum shopping, however, does not of necessity mean that
forum law applies. Before reaching that conclusion, it is necessary to analyze
several important differences between the bankruptcy courts and diversity
courts.15
0
First, a large number of rights that are adjudicated by a bankruptcy court
exist only in bankruptcy. The trustee or debtor in possession has certain
rights which only come into being once an involved debtor enters bank-
ruptcy. Under these circumstances, there is no real threat of forum shopping
between federal and state courts based upon more favorable choice of law
rules.' 5' Since no state court could hear the claim, it is disingenuous to
speak of forum shopping.
52
150. See, e.g., Note, Applicability of State Conflicts Rules When Issues of State Law Arise
in Federal Question Cases, 68 HAgv. L. REv. 1212, 1218-22 (1955) (although Klaxon does not
control in bankruptcy, courts may elect to use state conflicts rules based on considerations of
"fairness"). The approach suggested by the author is deficient in two respects. First, the Note
ambiguously focuses on "claims" instead of "rights." Most of the claims that arise in
bankruptcy are federal, because the parties will be litigating the matter in the context of some
issue arising under the Code. The applicability of Klaxon should turn on more than whether
the claim that is the subject of the pending adjudication is a "federal" or "state" law claim.
See supra text accompanying notes 17-19. Second, the author suggests that the bankruptcy
courts should "elect" to use state law absent countervailing considerations. As discussed supra
at text accompanying notes 90-92, there is no real difference between a rule requiring a court
to use state law and stating that the court "normally should" do so.
Most of the other commentators simply reject the Klaxon rule without any meaningful
discussion. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 544.02, at 544-13 through 14 nn. 15 & 16 (L.
King 15th ed. 1989) (stating that the "general view" is that state conflict rules do not apply);
4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.07, at 88-89 n.8 (because there is no need to curb the resort
to bankruptcy, the Klaxon rule should not apply). See also Countryman, The Use of State
Law in Bankruptcy (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407, 409 (1972) (Erie applies only in diversity
cases).
151. Obviously, there still may be "forum shopping" of the type discussed supra at note
4. In other words, a party may choose bankruptcy precisely because it offers certain rights
and remedies which do not exist at state law. This type of forum shopping, which is based
on the existence of a federal remedy, does not raise Klaxon problems. Klaxon represents a
limit on the ability of the federal courts to craft choice of law rules. As such, it is irrelevant
when Congress has purposely created a federal remedy different from those provided by the
states. Accordingly, there is no reason to deter "shopping" between the federal and state court
based on the availability of the federal remedy. See Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferron
& Co., 383 F.2d 46, 56 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968) (Klaxon inapplicable
in admiralty litigation).
This is not to say that the types of forum shopping that are discussed supra at note 4, are
irrelevant. These authors are rightly concerned with the issue of "shopping" between bank-
ruptcy and state law in general. This broader type of forum shopping presents a number of
additional considerations, and is accordingly beyond the scope of this article.
152. The same argument does not apply to the mixed claims. In one sense, the mixed claims
are similar to the bankruptcy remedies, because the same claim involving the same parties
could not have been heard by a state court. For example, even though state law might allow
unsecured creditors the right to sue to invalidate an improper bulk transfer, the debtor-
transferor would have no right to raise this claim under state law. The debtor's right to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance will only arise when the debtor dons the hat of a debtor-in-
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More importantly, one must consider the different origins of the diversity
courts and the bankruptcy courts. 53 Although the legislative history is sparse,
the generally accepted view is that the Constitution allows for diversity
jurisdiction in the federal courts 5 4 in order to prevent local bias against out
of state litigants. 55 Congress had the same goal when it elected to vest the
possession by seeking bankruptcy relief.
This difference in parties is not enough to remove the mixed claims from the dictates of the
Decision Act. Even though the parties are different, the fundamental claim is the same. The
fact that this claim is deemed "assigned" to another under federal law does not transform
the claim into a federal claim.
153. There are additional differences between the bankruptcy and diversity courts. These
differences, although facially appealing, do not actually distinguish the bankruptcy courts from
the diversity courts for the purposes of applying Erie. For example, one might argue that the
bankruptcy courts are constitutionally compelled to use a federal choice of law rule because
of the "uniformity" requirement of article I, section 8 of the Constitution. See U.S. CoNST.
art. I, § 8. In other words, because any bankruptcy law promulgated by Congress must be
uniform, the bankruptcy courts must utilize a single system of choice of law rules to act
uniformly. This argument must fail for several reasons.
First, the uniformity requirement is only a restriction on Congress' power to pass bankruptcy
laws. It is not a restriction on the powers of the federal courts to adjudicate. More importantly,
the uniformity restriction has not been interpreted as requiring a uniform federal bankruptcy
law. In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), the Court held that Congress
had not violated this restriction by incorporating state laws into bankruptcy, even though there
were important differences in the laws of the states. See also Baird, supra note 124, at 32 (the
"uniformity requirement" simply means that the bankruptcy law must apply in all states).
Another possibly significant difference between the bankruptcy courts and the diversity
courts is the enhanced personal jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. A bankruptcy court in
a forum has the power to bind parties in many situations where the forum courts themselves
could not exercise personal jurisdiction. Under Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d), the bankruptcy court
can issue nationwide service of process to bring parties into the forum. Diversity courts,
however, are bound by the scope of personal jurisdiction that could be exercised by the forum
courts. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(e), (f). Therefore, a bankruptcy court in a forum may be able to
adjudicate certain claims that could not be adjudicated by a forum court or diversity court.
Because the bankruptcy court may hear cases beyond the purview of the forum courts, some
authors have argued that Klaxon should not apply. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 49, at
799; Note, supra note 150, at 1218.
The personal jurisdiction argument is undercut by those cases which apply Klaxon even in
those diversity cases where the federal court can use extended service. In Griffin, the companion
case to Klaxon, the district court had relied upon the extended service provided by the precursor
to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 in statutory interpleader cases. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 501
(1941). Even though some of the defendants could not have been sued in the courts of the
forum, the Court held that the district court was obligated to apply the conflicts rules of the
forum. See also Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. McKay, 837 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1988);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 642 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Ill. 1986). In addition, Klaxon has
been applied in a case in which a third party defendant was served pursuant to the "100-mile
bulge" provisions of Federal Rule 4(0. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412 (5th Cir.
1979).
154. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides for diversity jurisdiction.
155. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). See also
Hill, supra note 113, at 451-52; Ely, supra note 104, at 713. But cf. Frank, Historical Bases
of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 22-28 (1948) (in addition to the
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federal district courts with diversity jurisdiction.5 6 Diversity jurisdiction
controls bias by creating the opportunity for parties to have their claims
heard in a neutral forum.) 7 The Constitution ensures federal court neutrality
by providing a judiciary appointed by the President, with life tenure on
good behavior. 5 In short, the primary function of the federal courts sitting
in diversity is to provide an alternative to a state court.
In one sense, a bankruptcy court is also an "alternative" to a state court.
Were it not for the happenstance of bankruptcy, many of the state-law
rights that are before a bankruptcy court would be adjudicated either by a
state court or by a diversity court. Most of the state-law rights that parties
hold will not be changed by the translation into the bankruptcy system.
Like the diversity courts, then, the bankruptcy courts offer an alternative
to the state courts.
At this point, however, the analogy ends. Although a bankruptcy court
does provide an alternative to a state court action, the justifications for
providing the alternative are altogether different. When establishing bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, Congress' prime concern was not prejudice. Instead,
Congress vested the federal courts with jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases
and proceedings related to bankruptcy cases primarily for reasons of effi-
ciency.159 Congress realized that it would be quicker and easier for a court
with jurisdiction over the debtor's property' 60 to wind up the debtor's affairs
if that same court also had the power to resolve all related claims.' 6'
prejudice rationale, the framers desired judges who would be sympathetic to commercial
interests and hoped to achieve more efficient administration of justice for the commercial
classes); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HAtv. L. REv. 483, 496-97
(1928) (suggesting that the framers were actually concerned with state insolvency statutes);
Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie Versus Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377,
380 (1967) (another purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to establish "points of contact" between
the state and federal systems).
It has also been argued that this fear of "local bias" underlies the other situations in which
the district courts are granted concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts. Hill, supra note
113, at 452. In other words, the framers mistrusted the state courts with respect to all claims
that might be heard in those state courts, regardless of whether the source of the claim is state
or federal.
156. See Hearings on Proposals Concerning Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Before the
Senate Subcommittee on Improvement in Judicial Machinery, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 521 (1978).
157. Diversity jurisdiction inures to the benefit of both plaintiff and defendant. Although
the plaintiff makes the initial determination of whether to file in state or federal court, the
nonresident defendant can remove the case to federal court if the case meets the requirements
for diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The fact that removal
in a diversity case is only available to nonresident defendants bolsters the argument that the
primary goal of diversity jurisdiction is the prevention of bias. See infra note 164.
158. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
159. H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I, at 46, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An mN. NEws 5963, 6007.
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (vests district court in which the title
11 case is commenced with exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the debtor).
161. Claims related to a bankruptcy case include both claims against the debtor and claims
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Although the Northern Pipeline62 decision had a substantial impact upon
this goal of administrative convenience, it nevertheless remains the primary
justification for the current jurisdictional scheme in bankruptcy.
A bankruptcy court, then, is an alternative to the entire gamut of non-
bankruptcy courts, not merely the courts of a single state. Is this difference
significant? From the standpoint of Klaxon, it is crucial. The effect of this
difference is to change the complexion of the concern with forum shopping
underlying Klaxon.
Klaxon is concerned with forum shopping between a state court and a
diversity court situated within that state. Not all such forum shopping is
inherently evil. Indeed, Congress intended to encourage certain types of
forum shopping when it provided for diversity jurisdiction. 63 By providing
a neutral forum, Congress encourages nonresidents who fear bias to adju-
dicate their dispute in a federal forum. This "allowable" forum shopping
is directly related to the reasons justifying the very existence of the diversity
courts. Forum shopping only becomes evil when it is done for reasons
unrelated to the fear of state court bias. When a party elects to use a
diversity court because of its advantageous substantive rules, the diversity
court is no longer acting merely as a "neutral" alternative to the courts of
the forum. Although the law applied by a diversity court may be viewed as
"better" from some absolute point of view, it is no longer state law applied
by a court insulated from procedural bias.164
Because the bankruptcy courts were created for reasons unrelated to
procedural prejudice,16 they do not overreach their authority by failing to
follow forum law. The bankruptcy courts in state A are intended to be an
alternative to all state courts, not merely the courts of state A. Therefore,
the fact that parties may have an incentive to pursue their claims in the
bankruptcy courts of state A rather than in the state courts of state A does
not necessarily mean that the bankruptcy courts have overstepped their
duties. The type of forum shopping underlying the Klaxon rule, "federal
by the debtor against other parties. The court must resolve the latter in order to determine
what is property of the estate.
162. 487 U.S. at 87-88 n.40.
163. Hill, supra note 113, at 451.
164. The Court in Erie also expressed some concern that diversity jurisdiction, designed to
be a shield preventing discrimination against nonresidents, might be turned into a vehicle for
discrimination against residents. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. Although this statement has been
criticized, Professor Ely has defended it by noting that the limitations on removal in diversity
cases contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) give the nonresident some ability to have the lawsuit
heard in federal court. Ely, supra note 104, at 712 n.111.
165. This is not to say that Congress was not concerned with prejudice when creating. the
bankruptcy courts. Arguably, Congress could have vested the state courts with jurisdiction to
hear bankruptcy cases. Congress' failure to do so may indicate some fear that the state courts
would be hesitant to afford the broad relief provided by the bankruptcy laws. This "prejudice,"
however, is based on the substantive rule of law, not on the citizenship of the parties involved.
In other words, a pro-creditor state court would be equally biased against a debtor regardless
of whether that debtor was a citizen of the state.
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court/forum court" shopping, is simply not a concern in bankruptcy. 166
The Code sets out no requirements that bankruptcy courts mirror the courts
of the various fora in which they are situated.
Nevertheless, a bankruptcy court does play the role of an "alternative"
court. Although not an alternative to an individual state court system,
bankruptcy courts are an alternative to the courts of all fifty states. There-
fore, a bankruptcy court may exceed its role if it, by using different choice
of law rules, creates an incentive for the party to have his rights adjudicated
in the bankruptcy court. This broader type of forum shopping creates
problems of its own.
However, one does not need to analyze the Klaxon line of cases to
determine whether this type of forum shopping is acceptable. Instead, one
need look no further than the statutory basis for the Klaxon rule - the
Decision Act. To the extent that the Decision Act affects the choice of law
determination, a bankruptcy court may be obligated to look to state law.
In essence, we have come full circle.
D. The Decision Act and Bankruptcy
Once one dismisses the forum shopping argument, it becomes apparent
that Klaxon may not apply in its entirety in bankruptcy. Most importantly,
since "federal court/forum court" shopping is no longer a major concern,
a bankruptcy court should be under no obligation to adhere to the choice
of law rules of the forum state when adjudicating a state law issue. Although
a bankruptcy court might be obligated to use state law to govern a dispute, 167
there is no reason why the state law chosen should be the same state's law
that would be applied by the courts of the forum. 6' Accordingly, use of
an independent choice of law rule by a bankruptcy court does not thwart
the goal of an alternate court system.
This does not mean, however, that state choice of law rules have no
application whatsoever in bankruptcy. Many of the rights that a bankruptcy
court must adjudicate during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding arise
under state law. 69 When the case before a bankruptcy court involves state
law rights, the Decision Act still controls. The Decision Act requires a
bankruptcy court to use state choice of law rules when interpreting state
law rights. This is the essence of the "Decision Act arm" of Klaxon, which
holds that a federal court must utilize state choice of law rules as part of
the state rules of decision. It therefore follows that a bankruptcy court
166. See Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REv.
66, 104 (1955), which suggests that forum shopping may be highly desirable in certain types
of cases in the federal courts, such as bankruptcy.
167. Nothing in this article suggests that a bankruptcy court adjudicating a pure state claim
or mixed claim is free to ignore existing state law altogether.
168. In situations where prejudice against nonresidents is a threat, the alternative federal
forum may still be an option. If the out-of-state litigant desires a "neutral" forum, she can
still bring the lawsuit in a federal district court if she can satisfy the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
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cannot reach a result inconsistent with the result that all state courts that
could hear the claim would reach. Accordingly, a bankruptcy court must
pay some heed to state choice of law rules.
There is a fundamental difference between the reference to state law
required in bankruptcy and the adherence to forum law mandated by
Klaxon. All the Decision Act requires is that the bankruptcy court not
ignore state law. The bankruptcy court must look to state law, including
state choice of law rules, for the parameters of the parties' rights. Nothing
in the Decision Act indicates, however, that the state law chosen be the law
of the forum. Instead, a bankruptcy court need only apply the law of some
state in order to adjudicate the parties' state law rights.
On the other hand, a bankruptcy court must ensure that the result in
bankruptcy does not differ substantially from the result that would have
been obtained in the absence of bankruptcy. Although not bound by the
law of any single forum, a bankruptcy court is not free to utilize rules of
decision that would not be used by any eligible state court. If a bankruptcy
court ignored all state law, it would exceed its role as an "alternative" to
the entire set of state courts. This places a significant restriction on the
freedom to select which state's laws should govern. At the very least, the
result reached in a bankruptcy court should mirror the result that would
have been attained by some state court.
E. Application of the Rule to Specific Types of Claims
The foregoing discussion indicates that the choice of law issue in bank-
ruptcy cannot be divorced totally from state choice of law rules. If bank-
ruptcy courts were free to create their own choice of law rules, they would
be free to apply substantive law that would not be applied by any non-
bankruptcy court that might have heard the case. Unless the result in
bankruptcy could have been reached by at least one competent nonbank-
ruptcy court, a bankruptcy court is not really adjudicating a state law right.
1. Pure and Mixed Rights
The foregoing analysis clearly applies to the "pure" and modified state
law claims discussed previously. 70 In these situations, the underlying dispute
is one that would have been heard in a state court or diversity court absent
bankruptcy. 7' Because a bankruptcy court is adjudicating state law rights
in the context of a state law claim, the Decision Act indicates that the
substantive law applied by a bankruptcy court should not differ from that
applied in the state courts.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
171. The transplantation of the state law claim into bankruptcy may give rise to additional
issues that would not be a factor in the state court proceeding. An obvious example is where
the trustee is attempting to recover damages for a lease containing a clause setting forth certain
modifications which automatically come into force upon bankruptcy. Section 365 renders these
clauses ineffective. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Although the suit in the
bankruptcy court now involves additional nonstate law issues, the dispute remains fundamen-
tally a state law breach of contract claim.
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At a minimum, then, a bankruptcy court should be limited in its selection
of state law to a state law that would be chosen by some state court. This
does not mean that a bankruptcy court must analyze the conflicts rules of
each of the fifty states on every claim it faces. Instead, a bankruptcy court
must determine which state courts would have the power to adjudicate the
dispute outside of bankruptcy. Once this is completed, a bankruptcy court
must choose from among the available fora's laws the law which is to
govern the dispute.
The first task of a bankruptcy court, then, is to prepare a list of courts
that could hear the claim. 1 2 This requires a court to determine which state
courts have personal jurisdiction over the defendants'" and in which state
courts venue properly lies.174 Unless the debtor or creditor is a large mul-
tistate corporation, the list of available fora should be relatively short.1
7
172. In many cases, the courts of foreign countries might also be able to hear a case. Where
the law of the foreign courts (including the conflicts rules) is available, the bankruptcy court
should also include the foreign courts in its list. A cause of action arising under the law of a
foreign country is, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from a "state law" claim
normally adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. The underlying rights will still be created by
nonbankruptcy law.
It should be noted that the bankruptcy- court adjudicating a foreign law claim is not required
to use the foreign choice of law rules. The Decision Act does not apply when foreign law is
involved. Nevertheless, when the foreign law is ascertainable, the court should use it to govern
all rights arising under foreign law. By so doing, the court will act in accordance with the
reasonable expectations of the parties.
173. In making this determination, the court should also consider the possibility of a
"preemptive" suit by a debtor against a creditor. For example, a debtor may be able to select
a forum by bringing a declaratory judgment action against a creditor. In this situation, the
important issue would be personal jurisdiction over the creditor, not the debtor.
Of course, it is theoretically possible that a defendant could be subjected to suit in any
state, district, or territory in the United States. As stated in the watershed case of Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), a defendant is subject to suit in any forum in which that defendant
is served while physically present, even if that defendant is merely passing through the state.
Cf. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980) (defendant's only connection
with the adjudicating forum was his physical presence).
The continuing validity of this type of "transient" jurisdiction is open to question, however,
following the Supreme Court's decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980), which emphasizes the foreseeability to the defendant of being called upon to
litigate the matter in the forum, and Shaffner v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), which holds
that all assertions of jurisdiction are to be measured by the "minimum contacts" standard.
Nevertheless, the possibility of "transient" jurisdiction could render the proffered analysis
meaningless. Because it might be possible to obtain "transient" jurisdiction over a party
anywhere in the United States, the bankruptcy court arguably could apply the conflicts rule
of any state or territory that it chose.
For the purposes of this analysis, a bankruptcy court should ignore those states in which
personal jurisdiction could be obtained only by these "transient" means. Instead, the court
should focus on those states in which personal jurisdiction could actually have been procured
in a nonbankruptcy action commenced on the date of the bankruptcy petition. The only
possible exception would be the case where it could be demonstrated that the potential defendant
was actually present, on the date of the bankruptcy petition, in a state with which he had less
than the required "minimum contacts."
174. A more complicated situation arises when the action could have been heard in a
diversity court. In this case, the court must consider both state and federal personal jurisdiction
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss4/10
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Following the compilation of this list, a bankruptcy court should look at
the conflicts rules of each of the available fora to determine which states'
substantive laws could be applied to the lawsuit. The resulting list will
indicate those states which would provide a "cause of action" for the given
transaction or occurrence. In most instances, this list should be even more
abbreviated than the first, because of the similarity in factors considered
by most states in their choice of law rules.
76
At this point, a bankruptcy court should select one "rule of decision"
from the list of available laws. In making this decision, however, a bank-
ruptcy court should no longer be bound by any of the requirements of state
law. In other words, once a bankruptcy court has determined that at least
one available state court would apply the law of state A to a cause of
action, the bankruptcy court may, consistent with the Decision Act and the
purposes of bankruptcy, choose that set of rules as controlling.'" The final
and venue rules. Because nothing in Erie requires the diversity court to follow state venue
rules, Stewart Org. v. Ricoh, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988), a diversity court may, in certain rare
cases, hear an action that could not be heard in the courts of the forum. Therefore, a state's
choice of law rules need not be excluded from the calculus merely because its state courts
would not be a proper venue to adjudicate the dispute. If the case is one that could have been
heard in a diversity court in that state, the bankruptcy court should also consider that state's
choice of law rules, because a diversity court sitting in that state would be required to do so.
175. In some instances, it is conceivable that no state court would be able to adjudicate the
dispute. This is most likely to arise when no state court could exercise jurisdiction over the
defendants in the dispute. Naturally, in such cases the bankruptcy court will be unable to
mimic the outcome in state court. Instead, the bankruptcy court must necessarily engage in
an independent determination of the choice of law problems, Le., apply "federal" choice of
law rules.
The foregoing situation does not create an anomaly. When no state court could have
adjudicated the dispute, the bankruptcy court does not run afoul of the Decision Act by
refusing to follow state choice of law rules. A party has a right to expect the application of
the choice of law rules of state A only if the courts of A would have jurisdiction to hear the
dispute.
176. The author of Note, supra note 150, at 1219, rejects this approach as too difficult.
This concern is somewhat exaggerated. First, unless the potential defendant is a large com-
mercial entity, it will be subject to suit in only a very few states. Second, and more importantly,
nothing requires the bankruptcy court to analyze each and every state's conflicts rules. Instead,
as a practical matter, the bankruptcy court need only use this analysis as a means of "checking
up" on its choice of substantive law.
In other words, the bankruptcy court, using general conflicts principles, may decide that the
transaction bears the greatest number of contacts with state D, so that the law of D should
govern. Before applying the law of D, however, the bankruptcy court should ensure that some
other state that could have heard the lawsuit (not necessarily D) would also apply the law of
D. If at least one potential forum would choose the law of D, the bankruptcy court is
accurately adjudicating a state law claim. If no viable state court would choose the law of D,
the bankruptcy court would be ignoring state law were it to determine the rights of the parties
in accordance with the law of D.
177. This result is fully consistent with the criteria set out by those authors cited supra at
note 4. These authors state that bankruptcy courts should follow state law in order not to
frustrate the commercial expectations of the parties. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 957.
The law that will be selected by the bankruptcy court using the above approach will be one
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choice of controlling law from among the available candidates is purely a
federal matter. 178 Once state law creates the list of options, a bankruptcy
court need not consult state law in determining which state has the greatest
connection to the transaction. As long as some state would apply the
substantive law ultimately chosen by the bankruptcy court, the court has
fulfilled its obligation to define the rights of the parties in accordance with
state law. Nothing in the Constitution, the Decision Act or the Code requires
anything more.
2. The Special Case of Bankruptcy Remedies
That category of cases comprising the bankruptcy remedies poses a more
difficult problem. As described previously, a proceeding involving a bank-
ruptcy remedy is one in which the fundamental rights being adjudicated are
created by the Code. Although the fundamental claim is federal, it cannot
be resolved without interpreting state law. It is the federal nature of the
remedy that makes the bankruptcy remedy a special situation. Unlike the
state law remedies previously discussed, the claim is not one which would
have been heard in a state court absent bankruptcy. 179 The right to recovery
does not even arise until the debtor enters bankruptcy.
that should have been foreseen by the parties. Unless the selected conflict rules are markedly
inconsistent with general choice of law principles, the state whose substantive law is eventually
chosen will have considerable contacts with the underlying transaction. Indeed, unlike the
diversity courts under Klaxon, the bankruptcy courts would have the ability to ignore grossly
unfair conflicts rules simply by adopting the law that would be chosen by a different available
state. Therefore, failing to utilize Klaxon in its entirety may actually result in less surprise and
unfairness of bankruptcy than would a mechanical application of the rule.
In addition, the fact that the bankruptcy court must consider personal jurisdiction furthers
the foreseeability factor. Because of the due process limitations on personal jurisdiction of the
state courts, a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a party only if that party could
reasonably foresee being haled into the forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
178. In making this determination, the bankruptcy court should have considerable discretion
in selecting which substantive law to apply. Over time, this should generate a "federal" law
of choice of law for use in the bankruptcy courts. There is nothing incompatible between this
result and Erie. The federal court is reaching a result consistent with the result that would be
reached by a state court. Therefore, the bankruptcy court is not creating a new federal
substantive law to govern the rights of the parties. The bankruptcy court is adjudicating state
law rights, albeit not necessarily in the form that those rights would be adjudicated in a forum
court.
179. It is possible, though unlikely, that a state court could adjudicate a bankruptcy remedy.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), provides the federal district courts with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case itself and exclusive jurisdiction
over all of the debtor's property, the district courts share jurisdiction with the state courts
over all disputes arising during the course of the bankruptcy case. Conceivably, then, a state
court could adjudicate a bankruptcy remedy if the bankruptcy court chose to abstain under
11 U.S.C. § 305 (1982), or 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). It is difficult to
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Because of this difference, one can argue that a bankruptcy court adju-
dicating a bankruptcy remedy should have the freedom to ignore state choice
of law rules altogether. Because the right arises under federal law, there
may be no compelling reason for a bankruptcy court to mimic the state
courts. 8 0 Indeed, if one focuses on the origin of the claim, it is disingenuous
to speak of mimicking a state court. Where a state court would never hear
the claim, there is nothing to copy.
This argument focuses its analysis on the wrong level. It is true that a
state court could not hear a bankruptcy proceeding. However, a state court
could adjudicate the state law rights presented in the course of resolving
the federal bankruptcy remedy.' 81 To adjudicate these state law rights ac-
curately, a bankruptcy court must not divorce itself totally from state choice
of law rules. If it does, a bankruptcy court may face a situation in which
the identical state law right appears more than once in a case, but is
interpreted differently depending on the context in which it is presented. 82
By creating this inconsistency, a bankruptcy court transforms a state law
right into one not recognized by the courts of those states that created the
right. At this point, the basic right becomes a federal law right instead of
a state law right.
Therefore, a bankruptcy court should also be bound by state choice of
law rules in cases involving bankruptcy remedies. To the extent that a
bankruptcy remedy relies on preexisting state law rights, a court should
look to state choice of law rules in order to ensure consistent adjudication.
A claim's federal origin should not authorize a bankruptcy court to ignore
state choice of law rules. Accordingly, the choice of law analysis for
bankruptcy remedies is no different than that for the more common state
law claims. Because state law rights are involved, a court must look initially
to state choice of law rules.
V Conclusion
Bankruptcy presents a number of special circumstances that complicate
the choice of law issue. Unlike a federal district court adjudicating a federal
question, a bankruptcy court faces many issues of state law. In liquidating
the estate of a debtor, a bankruptcy court will be required to resolve a
180. See, e.g., Note, supra note 150, at 1220-21.
181. These state law issues could become important in the context of adjudicating a state
law claim arising out of the same facts. For example, the bankruptcy remedy of a preference
may require the court to determine, inter alia, whether the creditor has perfected its security
interest. That same issue would also be crucial in a state law priority battle.
182. Utilization of different choice of law rules for "federal" and "state" claims could
result in unnecessarily complex problems of res judicata and collateral estoppel. For example,
assume that one of the debtor's creditors is an attorney. The law of state A recognizes
attorney's liens; whereas the law of state B does not. This state law lien right will be relevant
both to state law claims (e.g., the attorney's right to foreclose) and to a bankruptcy remedy
(e.g., whether a payment to the attorney is voidable as a preference under section 547 of the
Code). Therefore, it follows that the courts should strive for consistent interpretation of the
basic state law right.
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number of state law claims by and against the debtor. Because a bankruptcy
court adjudicates state law claims, issues of federalism arise that are not
present in the typical federal question case.
A bankruptcy court also differs in many respects from a diversity court.
The state law claims faced by a bankruptcy court are adjudicated in the
context of a uniquely federal insolvency proceeding. In addition, bankruptcy
courts were created for reasons different from those underlying the creation
of diversity courts. Unlike bankruptcy courts, diversity courts were intended
to deter prejudice against out of state litigants.
Bankruptcy courts, then, lie in the "gray area" between diversity courts
and courts hearing federal question cases. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the effect of state choice of law rules should also lie somewhere in the
middle. Because a bankruptcy court has a different purpose than a diversity
court, the Klaxon rule does not apply in full. Generally, Klaxon does not
require a bankruptcy court to adhere to forum choice of law rules. 83 Instead,
only that arm of the Klaxon rule requiring reference to state choice of law
rules applies in bankruptcy. A bankruptcy court, to satisfy the requirements
of the Decision Act, must use the same substantive law that some state
court of competent jurisdiction would have used.
The proffered rules strike a balance between the federalism issues that
are ever present in bankruptcy and the legitimate federal concern for an
efficient bankruptcy system. Although a bankruptcy court is not free to
ignore state substantive law, it should have a great deal more latitude in
dealing with state choice of law rules. As long as a bankruptcy court affords
proper respect to the important role that state law plays in bankruptcy, it
satisfies the requirements of both the Constitution and the Decision Act.
183. The bankruptcy court will be required to look to forum laws only in those instances
in which the choice of law rules of all available states would result in the use of forum law.
In a case involving an individual debtor, this situation will be uncommon.
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